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2Introduction
Shellsh, as a food category. has a distinctive history of regulation. Unlike
meat and poultry, shellsh has never been subject to 100% mandatory product
inspection by the federal zovernment. This absence of inspection does not
reect a regulatory decision that shellsh pose little risk to humans. On the
contrary{ the available statistics, although incomplete, indicate that seafood
illness made up about 5% of all foodborne illness cases between 1978 and 1984:
More importantly. 53% of these seafood illness cases were caused by molluscan
shellsh. The chance of contracting illness from nsh is only one in ve million,
but a serving of shellsh presents a risk of one in 250. Although illness can
be caused by either biological pathogens or chemical contaminants in seafood,
it is usually the naturally occurring pathogens that are responsible for human
illness. Pathogens enter water from domestic sewage or pass from humans or
other warm-blooded animals to seafood during subsequent handling.4 To prevent
contamination, then. regulation must address both the quality of the harvesting
beds and the subsequent handling of shellsh.
Both the pre-harvest and the post-harvest aspects of shellsh regulation
contain inherent diculties. As time passes, ensuring the quality of harvesting
beds becomes more arduous:
rstly, because of a general increase in pollution; and secondly, because when
the amount of a natural resource decreases, its value increases{ making illegal
harvesting of shellsh more protable, less deterrable, and more frequent.5 This
explains why human illness has increased
GAO, Seafood Safety: Seriousness Of Problems and Eorts to Protect Con-
sumers, Rep. No RCED-88-135 (August 10,1988).
Rep. No. RCED-88-135 at 2.
David S. Cloud, Food Safeiv: House 'Surf and Turf Fight Dooms Fish In-
spection, 48 Cong.Q. 43(1990).
Rep. No RCEDS8-]35.
Id.
3Cn en though many states, such as New York, now harvest fewer clams. Fur-
thermore, lack of enforcement regarding harvesting shifts the responsibility for
assuring that shellsh are safe and healthful... [to the] individual baymen.0
Shellsh diggers tend to be independent workers who have taken advantage of
the low cost of entry into an industry that still relies on manual labor.7 Be-
cause the baymen have not formed a cohesive industry, regulations often cannot
overcome each individual's incentive to exploit community resources.8 The gov-
ernment thus struggles to enforce pre-harvest sanitation requirements.
The industry that handles shellsh after harvest also presents a challenge for
regulation. Shellsh plants are mostly small and aged facilities, seasonally run,
and... many lack modem day technology.9 Seafood is one of the few remaining
food groups still a wild-caught esh food that frequently must be harvested
under dicult conditions and at varying distances from processing, transport
and retail  Agents simply cannot enforce regulations when they cannot even
reach the vessels that act as processing factories.11 And yet, despite all of the
factors that detract from seafood safety, aggressive controls over shellsh are
noticeably absent from the history of reiulation. Even today, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) samples less than 1% of our domestic seafood and
less than 30/0 of our imported seafood.1
Margaret Becker, New York Sea Grant Institute State University of New
York and Cornell University, The 1982 Shelsh-ReIated Disease Outbreak In
New York State: Agency Response and Ineraction, Rockefeller Institute Working
Papers, Feb. 1983 at 9.
Id at 6, 9
8 Id. at 33.
40 FedReg. 25916, 25919 (1975).
60 FedReg. 65096, 65097 (1995).
Consideration of Meat, Poultry and Seafood Inspection in the United States:
Heari,ii
Before the Subconim. on Livestock, Dairy & Poultry of the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 1 04th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Dr. Michael Friedman, Deputy Com-
missioner, Operations.
FDA) [hereinafter Dr. Michael Friedman].
Whereas the FDA inspected food rms every two to three years as of 1981,
today the FDA visits the same rms only once every ten years! FDA,USDA,
EPA & CDC, Discussion
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4Attempts to compose shellsh regulations meet with several obstacles. Any leg-
islation will necessarily have targeted and intense eects, because the shellsh
industry exists in discrete geographic areas where it dominates the local econ-
omy. On Long Island, for instance,' clamming is the third largest industry: it
brings $100 million dollars per year to the island economy and provides work
for more than 6,000 baymen and 1,100 shippers)4 Overzealous legislation could
economically destroy the shellsh industry, but if legislation is too hesitant, con-
taminated products may destroy the shellsh market. Insucient safeguards
have already left their mark. New York's share of the national clam market
fell from 50% to less than 30% in a decade," and, in 1990, overall consumption
of sh in the United States declined 15 percent- at least in part because of
decreased consumer condence in the quality of the sh we eat.16
One could accurately summarize shellsh regulation as a conglomeration of
federal agencies. Federal participants include: the Department of Health and
Human Services, which
Draft, Food Safety From Farm to Tabie.- A New Strategy for the 21st Cen-
tury (Feb.21, 1997), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/|dms/fs-draft.html
[hereinafter Food Safety]
This paper frequently oers New York State, and Long Island in particular,
to illustrate issues of shellsh regulation. There are many reasons why New York
stands out in a historical analysis. New York State at one time harvested the
most hard clams in the nation; in 1976, Suolk County alone produced 58% of
the total U.S. landings of hard clams. (SCPD, infra note 14, at 2). Long Island
has active shellsh groups and innovative programs dealing with shellsh safety.
The State Department of Health has had the most extensive foodborne illness
disease surveillance program in the nation since 1980 (COSMA, iP?fra note 72,
at 5). One group of Baymen developed the Green Seal program, a self policed
tagging system. However, the relationship between the Baymen and state agen-
cies has not always been smooth, nor has shellsh safety ben achieved. In
1985 the Department of Health believed that New York was implicated more
often than any other state as the source of shellsh, or as a possible source of
shellsh, in more of New York's health-related outbreaks and more incidents
than any other state. Id.
Rep. No. HR.D-84-36 (1984). See also Becker, supra note 6, at 9. In 1976
Long Island reached its maximum landing of hard clams: nine million pounds.
Clamming also creates a secondary market in marine related jobs such as sale
and repair of boats and equipment. Suolk County Planning Dept (SCPD),
Strategies and Recommendations for Revitalizing the Hard Clani Fisheries in
Suolk County New York 2 (1987)
Rep No HRD-84-36 (1984).
136 Cong Rec S2228-04 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1990).
5contains the FDA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;'7 the
Environmental Protection Agency;'8 the U.S. Department of Agriculture; the
U S. Department of Commerce, which contains the National Marine Fisheries
Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;'9 the Na-
tional Shellsh Sanitation Program; and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Eorts
to remedy seafood contamination have produced unexpected relationships such
as the FDA's interagency agreement with the USArmy to develop analytical
methods of detecting seafood toxins)U The United States even reaches out to
foreign governments, establishing compacts to exchange research on the sanitary
conditions of seafood. Once one adds state agencies to this federal conglomera-
tion, the complexity of shellsh regulation becomes quite evident. In New York,
not only does the federal government have authority, but also towns claim title
to the bay bottom, counties have jurisdiction, and the state's power extends
to three miles oshore.2' This historical survey reveals just how our intricate
system of overlapping agencies has evolved; more importantly, it reveals the
diculties particular to the shellsh industry{diculties that ensure that the
battle over shellsh regulation will continue well into the next century.
The CDC's primary responsibility is to work with state and local health
departments to identify and investigate sporadic cases and outbreaks of illness
Food Safety, supra note 12.
S EPA is responsible for water and air quality that can aect whether sh
are safe to eat.
and its establishes limits for pesticides. Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note
11.
For example. the FDA works with the NOAA in order to close federal
waters if oil spills, toxic blooms or other phenomena threaten seafood safety.
Paula Kurtzweil, Critical Steps Thitard Sqfer Seafood, FDA Consumer Nov-
Dec. 1997. The NOAA also runs a voluntary fee-for-service inspection program
for seafood processors. Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11
Rep. No RCED-88-135.
David R. Zimmerman. The Cop on the Boat. Tightening the Net Against
Unsaje Shellsh. FDA Consumer Feb. 1986 at 29 [hereinafter The Cop on the
Boat].
4
6Chapter One
Basic Facts About Shellsh Diseases
Shellsh are more problematic than other sh products because shellsh will
acquire any contaminants that exist in the surrounding water{ and usually at
higher concentrations Shellsh obtain their food and oxygen by ltering partic-
ulate matter from seawater.2 They are called lter feeders, because a muscular
siphon, the neck, sucks water into the animal and through its digestive system
where the food and oxygen are removed.23 In this process, shellsh can store
up bacteria or viruses. The bacteria or viruses found in the water do not harm
the shellsh, but they do remain within the animal for a long time{ even after
harvest. Aggravating the shellsh's susceptibility to contamination is its habi-
tat. The natural breeding ground for shellsh is an estuary: where a river meets
the sea. Unfortunately, these estuaries are also prime locations for cities, which
means that shellsh waters are more likely to be polluted than oshore waters.:4
Another reason that agencies subject molluscan shellsh to special safe-
guards is because unlike crustacean shellsh (e.g., crabs, shrimp and lobsters),
molluscan shellsh are generally eaten whole and raw. For federal regulatory
purposes, the word shellsh has traditionally included oysters, clams and mus-
sels. Regulations exclude scallops even though they, too, are lter feeders. The
regulations explain that frequently, only the scallop's adductor muscle is eaten;
this reduces the risk of illness because viruses and bacteria are not accumulated
in the adductor muscle. The latest regulations actually include scallops in their
denition of shellsh, but they
Carol Ballentine, Pollution Narrows Shellsh Harvest, FDA Consumer, Feb.
1985 at 10 [hereinafter Pollution Narrows].
-' New York State Department of Health, Shellsh Related Illness (pamplet
on le with author).
Roger W. Miller, Getting Hooked on Seafood Safety, FDA Consumer, June
1991. at 7
5
7contain an exception stating that the regulations do not apply if only the adduc-
tor muscle is eaten. Thus, the regulations continue the policy of dening shellsh
according to the risk they present, rather than their biological category.
Consumption of shellsh can cause illness for several reasons. Most com-
monly, a shellsh causes illness because it is carrying either bacteria or viruses.
Bacterial pathogens might include Vibrio cholerae, Vibrio parahaemolyticus,
Vibrio vulnicus, or Clostridium botulinum. Viruses include hepatitus A and
the Norwalk virus. There are shellsh toxins such as paralytic shellsh poi-
son, amnesiac shellsh poison and demoic acid poison.26 Parasites and related
worms can also infect the shellsh.7 Some bacteria and viruses are introduced
into the water by humans, through pollution, for example. Other pathogens
occur naturally and cannot be prevented Unfortunately, current science lacks a
practical method to detect most viruses{ whether in water, shellsh or patients.
For most reported outbreaks, agencies cannot identify an etiologic agent; they
merely hypothesize that a virus caused the illnesses78 Furthermore, although
it is understood that improper food handling causes bacterial infection, such
post-harvest conduct may or may not cause virus-induced infection)9 Thus, in-
formation regarding seafood viruses is limited.
-. New York State Department of Health, Shellsh Related Illness.
- FDA and CDC estimate that there are approximately twenty cases per
year of poisoning
caused by the presence of these toxins in shellsh. Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis: Procedures
for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Prod-
ucts, 60 Fed. Reg
65096-01 (1995) (codied at 21 C F R. x123, x1240).
U.S Dept HI-IS, CFSAN, Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natu-
ral Toxins Handbook, available at Bad Bug Book, http //vm.cfsan fda gov/|
mow/sea-ill.html. [hereinafter Bad Bug Book].
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of I ThaI
Gastroenteritis Related to Consumption of Qvsters{ Louisiana, Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, & North ('arolina, 1993 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 49
(Dec. 17, 1993)
Herbert L. DuPont, M.D., Consumption of Ral4.' She gsh- Is the Risk Now
Unacceptable 3 14 New Eng J.Med. 707, 708 (1986).
6
8Nevertheless, agencies have compiled a good deal of data on the more common
illnesses caused by shellsh. The following catalogue divides seafood illness into
four categories. The rst tvo categories are bacterial and viral illness linked to
pollution. The remaining two subheadings describe unpreventable, or naturally
occurring, bacteria and viruses.
I Bacterial illness linked to pollution Thphoid
One bacterially- caused illness is typhoid fever. Although it was once the
most common shellsh-borne disease, no documented cases of typhoid fever have
been reported due to eating shellsh since 1954. so Typhoid can be transmitted
from sewage or from improper handling by an infected person. In 1939, for
example, 87 cases of typhoid were attributed to fecal contamination of a storage
area by a typhoid carrier.3'
Gastroenteritis
Gastroenteritis is an inammation of the lining of the stomach and the in-
testines. Symptoms such as abdominal cramps, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting,
headache, fever and chills may occur from 4 to 48 hours after eating food. Many
dierent bacteria and viruses can cause gastroenteritis, including Norwalk virus
and Vibrio vulnicus
3(1 Carol Ballentine, Weighing the Risks of the Rcm' Bar, FDA Consumer.
Sept. 1986 at 2 I [hereinafter Weighing the Risks].
Manual of Operations, Part I, National Shellsh Sanitation Program, 1995
at C-8 [hereinafter NSSP Manual 1995].
7
9I i hrio pLlrahaemolyticus
Vibrio parahaemolyticus is an example of bacteria that will cause gastroen-
teritis. Both pathogenic and nonpathogenic forms of the bacteria exist. The
bacteria will multiply in improperly refridgerated seafood. Major outbreaks
have occurred in the United States during the warmer months of the year.3:
For example, on August 23, 1997 the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services released a statement advising consumers to check the source of any
fresh oysters purchased within the preceding week, because warm weather in
the Pacic Northwest had raised the amount of V parahaemolyticus in shellsh
to unsafe levels. Approximately forty illnesses were reported in California and
Washington, with one hundred more in British Columbia. The Pacic Coast
Oyster Growers Association voluntarily halted shipments of live oysters, and
the FDA advised consumers to fully cook oysters in order to kill the bacteria.33
Thrio cholerae
Vibrio cholerae is the bacterium that causes cholera, an illness that can range
from mild diarrhea to fatal dehydration. While no major outbreaks have oc-
curred in United States since 1911. there were several cases between 1973 and
1991 aliated with consumption of raw or improperly cooked shellsh. The
cases suggest that the V. cholerae organism has reappeared in the U.S. ma-
rine and estuarine environment Environmental studies conrm that strains of
cholerae currently exist in temperate estuarine and marine waters.34
Bad Bug Book. supra note 27. at chapter 9.
Judith Foulke, HHS News: Statement Advising Consumers About Oysters
From the Pacic Northwest, U S. Dep't Health & Human Services, available at
http:// www.fda.ov/ bbs topics! NEWS! NEW00586 html
Bad Bug Book supra note 27. at chapter 7.
8
102 Viral illness linked to pollution Hepatitis A
One virus-caused illness is hepatitis A, a disease of the liver. Hepatitis A
virus can get into the body from eating raw or even steamed shellsh that were
harvested from polluted waters. Symptoms may appear from fteen to fty days
after eating the food, and they include fever, nausea, vomiting and abdominal
discomfort, followed by an enlargement of the liver. Severe cases can cause liver
damage and death. From 1960 through 1963, over 1,000 people were diagnosed
with hepatitis A illness after eating oysters and clams.  Only very high heat
will destroy the hepatitis A virus.36
Norwalk
The Norwalk virus acquired its name because it was rst discovered in 1968
during an outbreak of gastroenteritis linked to drinking water in Norwalk, Ohio.
Today we have identied Norwalk virus as responsible for 181,000 illnesses each
year.37 Shellsh are contaminated either by infected food handlers or by boats
dumping raw sewage overboard. Symptoms of Norwalk virus infection trace the
symptoms of gastroenteritis; persons usually recover within two to three days
without serious or long term health eects.38 Scientists have discovered many
calciviruses that are related to the Norwalk virus, including a virus found in
oysters that caused six illnesses in Florida in 1980. In 1982, 1,017 people in
New York State became ill within seven months due to
Weighing the Risks. supra note 30.
3c. Carol Ballentine, For Oyster and Clam Lovers, The Water Must Be
Clean, FDA
Consumer, Oct. 1984, at 24 [hereinafter Water Must Be Clean].
Centers for Disease Control, Oce of Communication Division of Media
Relations, CDC Fact Sheets. Nont'alk-like I ?ruses, Nov. 28, 1997, available at:
http I! www.cdc.gov/od/oc /medialfact/norwalkv. html
Id.
9
11Norwalk- contaminated shellshi3 In 1993, several oyster-related gastroenteritis
outbreaks occurred. Seventy-three persons in Louisiana and about 130 others
in Maryland, Mississippi and North Carolina, became ill.4' Another multistate
outbreak occurred in January 1995 In a 1996 outbreak, the infected oysters were
traced to a malfunctioning sewage system.
3. Naturally Occurring Viruses Paralytic Shell Poison
sh
In addition to human pollution, shellsh can be infected by viruses that occur
naturally in the water. One naturally-occurring virus is paralytic shellsh poi-
soning (PSP){ also called Red Tide. Red Tide is caused by a one-celled algae-like
microorganism of the genus Gonyaulax Gonyaulax appears in coastal waters
of Canada, New England, California and Alaska. The microorganism produces
a nonprotein poison, fty times more potent than the paralytic poison curare.43
When the gonyaulax blooms in shellsh harvesting waters, the shellsh become
poisonous because they ingest the toxins during lter feeding. The term Red
Tide developed because the water sometimes contains plankton (dinoagellates)
in such numbers as to discolor the water Unfortunately, the shellsh may be
carrying the plankton several days before the water changes color45 and actual
discoloration is relatively rare' The PSP toxin acts on humans
- Weighing the Risks, supra note 30, at 2 1-23. Id.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Multistate Outbreak of Viral
Gastroenteritix Related to Consumption of Qysters{ Louisiana, Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, and North Carolina, 1993, 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 49
(Dec. 17, 1993).
Carol Ballentine. Red Tide, FDA Consumer, Dec. 1980- Jan.1981, at 30
[hereinafter Red lide].
Id.
Miller, supra note 24 at 10.
Id.
Red T'de, supra note 42 at 32.
10
12within minutes, and there is no antidote. The toxin causes tingling in the lips,
burning sensations and numbing. Death from respiratory failure can occur in
three to twelve hours. Treatment consists of diuretics and emetics to empty
the gastrointestinal tract, and articial respiration. Although the minimum
amount of toxin needed to cause illness is unknown, death has been caused by
ingestion of only 450 to 1,100 micrograms of the toxin. In a recent outbreak
the contaminated clams contained 4,000 micrograms of toxin per 100 grams of
meat; where clams weigh about 10 grams, a person could receive a lethal dose
from eating only three clams.47 No amount of cooking can completely deactivate
the toxins that cause PSP.48
Most attempts to prevent PSP have achieved only limited success. Because
toxin levels can rise dramatically almost overnight, even routine collection of
shellsh samples will not ensure the safety of harvesting waters.49 States can
only respond to illness reports when harm has already been done. For example,
California quarantined all mussels during an outbreak in 1927, but not before
102 illnesses and six deaths occurred. The presence of the bacteria and di-
noaggelates that cause PSP are linked to water temperature, such that less
bacteria appear when the water is colder. Aer the presence of Red Tide in-
creased steadily through the nineteen-eighties, California banned sports harvest-
ing of mussels from May I to October 3 1. In 1984, California mussels showed
unusually high levels of toxin early in the year, prompting the state to impose
its harvesting ban two months early, in March.
In 1972 the rst PSP epidemic on the east coast occurred. In that year,
nearly one hundred dead black ducks and gulls were discovered in the Plum
Island, Massachusetts estuary. Scientists who performed autopsies on the birds
found mollusk shells in the birds' intestines. Soon
Id.
Water Must Be Clean, supra note 36.
Red Tide, supra note 42.
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13thereaer, Gonyaulax was discovered in Gloucester, Massachusetts water. The
State Department of Health quickly banned all shellsh harvesting, but despite
the department's quick reaction, t'entv-six people became ill with PSP. Since
then, Massachusetts has had problems with (ionvaulax almost every year
4 Naturally Occurring Bacteria I  brio idnicus
Vibrio vulnicus is a free-living bacterium, which, because it occurs natu-
rally in marine waters, cannot be avoided by eating oysters from clean water.
V. vulnicus poses particular diculties because it appears in many varieties{
some harmful, some not{ and it is found in low levels in all water) The single
consolation is that bacteria within the Vibrio species can be killed by cooking5'
If ingested, V.vulnicus can cause primary septicemia5 or gastroenteritis. It
can also cause infection by directly contaminating open wounds, such as lac-
erations incurred through shellsh cleaning.53 The data on illness caused by V
vulnicus is limited. Between 1975 and 1985 the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) recorded only twenty-ve reported cases (including twelve mortalities)
of V. vulnicus primary septicemia due to eating raw oysters or other
Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Seafood Inspection Program,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Dept Operations, Research & Foreign Agri-
culture of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 209
(1990) (statement of James Benson, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs)
[hereinafter James Benson]. For example, V. vulnicus is present in up to 50%
of oyster beds with water conditions of temperature> 68 F [>20C] and salinity
of K 16 parts per thousand. These conditions are normal for the Gulf of Mexico
during warm months. Centers for Disease Control, I 'ibrio I dnicus Infec-
tions Associated With Eati;it' Raw Oysters{ Los Angeles,1996, 45 Morbidity
& Mortality Wkly. Rep. 29 (July 26. 1996)
Water Must Be Clean, supra note 36.
- Primary septicemia is blood poisoning.
Water Must Be Clean, supra note 36. See also CDC, I ibrio I 'ulnicus
Infections Associated with Raw Oyster Consumption{ Florida, 1981-1992, 42
Morbidity & Mortality Wkl Rep. 21, (June 4, 1993).
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14seafood.54 However, regional surveillance in four states along the Gulf Coast in-
dicates a higher annual incidence for V. vulnicus infections: at least 0 6 per one
million persons, and a case-fatality rate of 22%. In fact, the Florida Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services recorded 125 cases of V. vulnicus,
in which 35% were fatal, between 1981 and 1992.56 The FDA's estimation that
twelve to twenty-six reported cases occur annually, with fatalities averaging
between ve and twelve, thus seems fairly accurate.57 In a 1995 brochure the
FDA warned consumers that 40% of V. vulnicus infections from raw oyster
consumption are fatal.58
There is evidence that V. vulnicus presents a special risk to people with liver
disease, such as cirrhosis or hepatitis.59 Also at risk are people with hemochro-
matosis, iron disorder, diabetes, stomach problems such as low stomach acid,
cancer, immune disorder such as HIV, and long-term steroid use (as for asthma
and arthritis)i'4 For people with at-risk medical conditions, consumption of
Vibrio oysters can cause sudden chills, fever, nausea, vomiting, blood poisoning
and death within two days. FDA estimates that there are about nine million
at-risk people who should not eat raw or under-cooked molluscan shellsh.6' In
order to alert the at-risk population,
Pollution Narrows, supra note 22. at 13.
W.C. Levine, P.A. Grin & Gulf Coast Vibrio Working Group, Vibrio In-
fections on the Gulf Coast. the Results of a First Year of Regional Surveillance,
167 J. Infect Dis. 479 (1993).
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vibrio Vulnicus Infections As-
sociated with Raw Qyster Consumption{ Florida, 1981-1992, 42 Morbidity &
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 21, (June 4, 1993).
However, about one third of these illnesses are from bacterial entry into
the body from wounds{ usually experienced by commercial shermen. Seafood
Safety, Hearings on The She llsh Safety Act, H.R. 1412 Before the Subomm. on
Fisheries Management of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries,
103d Cong., 1st Sess 9-30, 5 1-124 (1993) (statement by Thomas J Billy, Dir,
Oce of Seafood, CFSAN) [hereinafter Thomas J. Billy].
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Brochure: If you eat raw oysters, you need to
knOw..., July 1995, available at. http://vm.cfsan.fda. gov/|lrd/oyster. html
Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 13.
6' If you eat raw oysters, you need to know..., supra note 58.
Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
13
15FDA/CFSAN, Guidance Documents for Trace Elements in Shellsh, available
at http /1' vm cfsan.fda gov/ -frfYguid-sf html
the FDA has attempted to establish a liasion with medical and health com-
munities. The Oce of Health Aairs acts as one link between FDA and
medicine; it is campaigning to include computerized printouts that describe
the risk of Vibrio vulnicus within any prescription for an at-risk condition.6
14
16Chapter Two
Current Methods Used to Discover Contaminated Shellsh
Today, agencies determine the safety of shellsh according to the cleanliness
of the water. States test water samples for fecal coliform bacteria, which are
called indicators. Fecal coliform bacteria are commonly found in the intestines
of warmblooded animals, and their presence indicates that there is sewage in the
water.63 Agencies worry about the presence of even domestic sewage because
such sewage can carry and transmit more than one hundred dierent viruses to
shellshf' Sewage also enhances the ability of bacteria and viruses to survive
in seawater. Sewage can enter the water via euent from sewage treatment
plants, cesspools, or even storm sewer runo from streets befouled by dogs.65
For example, on Long Island, bacteria historically entered the bays through
waste produced by duck farms66
The National Shellsh Sanitation Program (NSSP) Manual establishes ac-
ceptable microbiological standards for shellsh growing waters. If waters fail to
meet microbiological standards; shellsh harvesting from that area is generally
forbidden. Because the supply of unpolluted waters is continually shrinking,
we have been forced to develop exceptions to this rule; for example, shellsh
harvested from contaminated areas may be marketed if they are relayed or
depurated.07 Relaying entails transplanting shellsh from polluted areas to ap-
proved areas under the theory that the shellsh will pump clean water through
its system{ at a rate of 15-20 gallons
Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 11.
Id at 13.
6' The Cop on the Boat, supra note 21, at 31.
0 Id
Daniel A. Hunt, Microbiological Standards for Shellsh Growing Waters{
Past, Present and Future Utilization, 69 Proceedings of the National Shellsh-
eries Association 142 (1979)
15
17per dayoS and will eventually be cleansed. Similarly, depuration involves
submerging shellsh in tanks of clean water in order to ush out pathogens.
The length of time required to purge contaminants from the shellsh is aected
by the amount and type of contaminants, the species of shellsh, temperature
and various environmental factors.69 Microorganisms such as viruses may sur-
vive for up to four months within oysters that are submerged in clean water.70
Nevertheless, both relaying and depuration provide a general benet of remov-
ing shellsh from uncertied waters, thus removing the temptation to poach
there.7' Depuration is not a simple solution, however. It requires strict surveil-
lance and enforcement to ensure that shellsh designated for depuration are
indeed depurated and that the entire system from harvest to depuration to
market is not short-circuited. i' Also, there is a fear that transplanting shell-
sh may bring Gonyaulax organisms to new marine areas where PSP had not
previously existed.73
The NSSP Manual sets forth ve possible classications of a growing area:
approved. conditionally approved, restricted, conditionally restricted, and prohibited.74
Areas are approved if the sanitary survey and marine biotoxin surveillance data
indicate that fecal
68 The C'op on the Boat, supra note 21, at 3 1.
69 NSSP Manual 1995 at D-l.
One author fears that the standards for depuration are erroneously based
on the rate of loss of bacteria from contaminated shellsh which probably do
not apply to viruses. DuPont, supra note 29, at 708. Studies demonstrate that
clams contaminated with virus retained 50-909/a of the virus after being released
in unpolluted water and kept there for up to two months! Under bacterial
monitoring, depuration may be required for as little as 72 hours. Id
The Cop on the Boat, supra note 21, at 31; SCPD, supra note 14, at 25. Re-
layed clam beds also create a positive incentive because when transplanted beds
are later opened to diggers, they will increase the size of the legal harvest.
Coastal Ocean Sciences and Management Alternatives (COSMA) & Livmnn
Marine
Resources Institute, Raw Shellsh and Public Health: Are There Acceptable
Alternatives to a
Cooking Requirement to Reduce Health Risks to an Acceptable Level? Working
Paper No. 15.
June 27, 1985, at 9. [hereinafter COSMA]. SCPD, supra note 14, at 25.
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-7.
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18material, pathogenic microorganisms, poisonous and deleterious substances are
not present in the area in dangerous concentrations. 05 Conditionally approved
waters are waters that are subject to intermittent and predictable pollution
events. Waters may be subject to intermittent pollution because of seasonal
population, the sporadic use of a harbor facility or the success of a wastewater
treatment facility. Under conditional approval the state sets the conditions
during which shellsh may not be harvested; for example, when the river..,
reaches 3.66 meters.. the area will be closed.76 A restricted classication means
that waters are subject to a limited degree of pollution, but shellsh are safe once
they are subjected to relaying or depuration. Conditionally restricted means
that the water usually meets restricted standards (i.e., shellsh must be relayed
or depurated) but predictable pollution events occur that make water unsafe.
Areas are classied as prohibited either because there is no current sanitary
survey or because any of the dangerous substances listed under approved are
present in excessive concentrations. If water is classied as prohibited, the
taking of shellsh for any human food purposes from such areas is forbidden.77
In order to classify growing areas within one of the ve categories listed
above, the NSSP Manual sets forth microbiological standards{ or the level of
fecal coliform bacteria{ permitted in the water. In 1986, the NSSP manual was
revised for the rst time in over 20 years, and the revision lowered the level of
fecal coliform indicators permissible in determining the sanitary
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-8
Id. at C-16.
Id. at C-21.
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19quality of water.78 The 1995 NSSP Manual states that in order for a growing
area to be
approved79
[t]he bacteriological quality of every sampling station in those portions of the
area exposed to fecal contamination shall meet one of the following standards:
i. The total coliform median or geometric mean MPN [most probable num-
berf' of the water does not exceed 70 per 100 ml and not more than 10 percent
of the samples exceed an MPN of 230 per 100 ml for a 5-tube decimal dilution
test (or an MIPN of 330 per 100 ml for a 3-tube decimal dilution test)...
ii. The fecal coliform median or geometric mean MPN of the water does
not exceed 14 per 100 ml and not more than 10 percent of the samples exceed
an MPN of 43 per 100 ml for a 5-tube decimal dilution test (or an MPN of 49
per 100 ml for a 3-tube decimal dilution test).8'
Water samples must be taken from stations located adjacent to actual or
potential sources of pollution, and must be collected during times of adverse
pollution conditions.8 This NSSP test has been dubbed the 70-standard. Studies
reveal that water with a coliform level of 70 is unlikely to cause diseases related to
fecal contamination. An MPN of 70 is equivalent to fecal material contributed
from one person diluted in about 2.27 x i0 liters (8 million cubic feet) of
coliform free water.83 The NSSP predicts that such a small amount of sewage
is of negligible health signicance and has probably also been treated, diluted,
and aged. In addition to the
Weighing the Risks, supra note 30, at 23.
The 1995 NSSP Manual provides two methods of testing water quality: the
adverse pollution condition strategy and the systematic random sampling strat-
egy This paper discusses the adverse pollution condition strategy. The state may
use the second testing method, systematic random sampling, only if the water
is not impacted by point source pollution. The systematic random sampling
strategy was created by the ISSC in 1989. It requires that the total coliform
median MPN does not exceed 70 and the 90th percentile does not exceed an
MPN of 230 per 100 ml
S The MPN is dened as a statistical estimate of the number of bacteria per
unit volume [that] is determined from the number of positive results in a series
of fermentation tubes. NSSP Manual 1995 at DEF-2
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-8 to C-9.
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-9.
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-b.
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2070-standard there is a second part to the NSSP test: the limitation that the
upper 10% of contamination not exceed MPN 230. In other words, water that
is grossly contaminated 10% of the time may be classied as approved. One
author argues that the 70-standard is actually a misnomer: an approved station
may have 40% of its sample values in the range of 70-230 and 10% of its samples
exceeding 230. Therefore, approximately 1/2 of the samples taken from a routine
sampling station... can exceed a coliform MIPN of 70.984
In order to have a complete sanitary survey, agencies must consider not only
the microbiological assessment of water but also pollution sources, meteorolog-
ical factors and hydrographic factors. Direct discharges into water (from septic
tanks, or municipal and industrial waste discharges) non-point sources (such as
stormwater runo and wildlife area runo), tidal amplitude, prevailing winds,
water circulation and rainfall patterns will all aect the quality of water and
will determine where classication boundaries begin and end. These factors
may also determine whether water can be conditionally approved. For instance,
a state may condition approval on the wastewater treatment plant achieving a
particular level of performance; however. extremely low tides may make the
usually sucient level of treatment inadequate)'5
The practice of testing shellsh safety by the presence of indicator organisms
is not always accurate. The ratio between the number of indicator organisms
and the actual number of pathogens can change with every milliliter of euent,
depending upon such factors as number of carriers or active cases in the pop-
ulation, degree of treatment of sewage, dilution, and other factors.8' In other
words, just because the level of fecal material is low, one cannot assume that
the number of viable pathogens in the water is low. If the water is directly
contaminated with
Hunt, supra note 67, at 143
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-14
Hunt, supra note 67. at 144
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21small amounts of fresh sewage, bacteriological examination would not reveal a
problem{ the water would still pass the 70-standard{ but human illness may
occur. Conversely, shellsh harvested from waters containing relatively high
levels of viable sewage organisms could be safely consumed if no pathogens
were present.87 Banning all shellsh from polluted waters is thus both over- and
under-inclusive. There are viruses such as Vibrio vulnicus that occur naturally
in all water{ even unpolluted water. At the other end of the spectrum, acres
of water are closed under the microbiological standard without proof of a single
contaminated shellsh.
Due process challenges to microbiological standards on the basis of over-
inclusiveness have been generally unsuccessful. In 1942, clam diggers went to
court to protest the closing of Raritan Bay.88 They claimed that the closure was
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable because the Department of Health had
not shown a single contaminated clam taken from the bay. The court rejected
the diggers' claim, holding that [t]he presence of polluted waters is sucient.
Authorities should not wait until contamination is real.89 In 1961, an outbreak
of infectious hepatitis closed the bay completely and over 3,000 sherman were
unemployed. A similar court battle occurred in New York in l977.' Based on
NSSP standards, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) closed
approximately 1500 acres of the Great South Bay, making closed waters in the
Bay total nearly 3100 acres.9: The court found that the coliform test did not
violate due process because it was the most accurate testing procedure currently
87 Id
De Roche v Osborne, 179 Misc. 589, 37 NYS. 2d 348, (Sup.Ct, Richmond
Co 1942) See also Hunt, supra note 67, at 144.
179 Misc. at 592.37 NYS. 2d at 351.
.1 Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 12
Villani v. Berle, 91 Misc. 2d 603, 398 N Y.S. 2d 786 (Sup Ct., Suolk Co.
1977)
91 Misc. 2d at 613, 398 NYS. 2d at 804 By 1986 the number of acres closed
in the Great South Bay had grown to 3,870 (1 30/o) and closed waters in New
York were more than 25,000 in 1983. Becker, supra note 6, at 11.
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22available and alternatives were either economically unfeasible or scientically
unacceptable.  The court explained that the DEC's decision had a rational
basis because it followed NSSP
procedures. The court did, however, empathize with the position of the
baymen.
it is small consolation to a bayman who earns his livelihood by shellsh
harvesting to tell him that more precise criteria may allow the opening of lands
now closed to harvesting; in fact this may not be the case, regardless of whatever
criteria is used, if the Great South Bay continues to be used as the repository
for society's waste products94
Regulation by water quality can produce seemingly unfair results because it
provides no
connection between the party causing the health problems and the party
being regulated Penalties provide little incentive for increased safety because
the harvesters{ who are greatly aected by water closings{ have little control
over the quality of the water. Every year, restricted shellsh harvesting areas
are increasing In 1980 almost 3 million acres were closed.9 The harvesters
intuitively ght the microbiological standards, but it is not the standards that
prevent the baymen from clamming{ it is the encroachment of pollution.
Even if we acknowledge the inaccuracies of the microbiological standard, no
better regulatory alternative seems possible. To avoid banning clean shellsh,
agencies would have to test each shellsh for bacterial and viral pathogens;
however, there is no routine method of detecting most viral pathogens that
exist in shellsh{ including severe viruses such as hepatitis A. Furthermore,
the sheer volume of shellsh would make it impossible to test a statistically
signicant sample?' Agencies could also require that all shellsh be subjected
to heat treatment in
91 Misc. 2d at 610, 398 N.Y S. 2d at 802.
Id. at 613-614, 804.
- Miller, supra note 24. Whereas oyster production along the gulf coast
and eastern seaboard used to ourish at over 100 million pounds per year, in
1982 production was at 54.3 million pounds{ and that was a record high! Id.
As of 1986, 17% of Long Island's bay bottom (200,599 acres out of 1,188,470)
was closed, along with most of New York's other clam-bearing waters. See The
Cop on the Boat, supra note 21, at 3 1.
Hunt, supra note 67, at 145.
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23order to inactivate microbiological pathogens; however, heat treatment would
not eliminate toxic chemicals or marine toxins.97 Still, the FDA recognizes that
more accurate detection methods are necessary. Rather than continuing to rely
on indicators, the FDA is developing gene probes and iene amplication tech-
niques to detect viruses directly{ new scientic methods that are an oshoot of
AIDS research. Some FDA laboratories are concentrating on better detection of
Vibrio bacteria alone.38 Although tests such as the polymerase chain reaction
assays can sometimes identify the etiology of an outbreak that has occurred,
the FDA is anxious to develop new assays that will detect viral pathogens in
products before the products are ever distributed to consumers.99 The FDA
coordinates research activities with the National Marine Fisheries Service, an
agency within the Department of Commerce, ' and it collaborates with the
Center of Marine Biology of the University of Maryland. " The FDA has pro-
gressed such that shellsh are now monitored for at least 10 pathogens, including
Vibrio vulnicus, Vibrio parahaemolyticus, nibrio Cholerae, Salmonella, Listeria
monocytogenes, Campylobacter jejuni, ecoli, and Yersinia enterocolitica.
In addition to pathogens, shellsh may contain poisonous and deleterious
substances such as heavy metals, pesticides, petroleum products, polychlori-
nated biphenyls, and naturally occurring biotoxins.' ' There has been much
debate whether the FDA should establish tolerances
Id.
Seafood Safety, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Con-
servation and the Em'ironment of House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fish-
eries, 1 02d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-129, 160-187 (1991) (statement of Douglas L.
Archer, Acting Director, Oce of Seafood & Deputy Director, CFSAN). [here-
inafter Douglas L. Archer].
42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 49, supra note 41.
Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11.
The FDA's Columbus center, in downtown Baltimore, is particularly aimed
to work with the University of Maryland. It specializes in marine toxin research.
FDAICFSAN, Guidance Documents for Trace Elements in Shellsh, supra note
62.
C Vein Modeland. Fishing for Facts on Fish Safety, FDA Consumer, Feb.
1989 at 16, 21
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24for these shellsh contaminants. Tolerances are usel because if a con-
taminant exceeds the published standard, there is a presumption that the food
violates the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act' even without
proof of harm. Standards are not a prerequisite for agency action, but with-
out them, the FDA must bring an individual enforcement action to establish
that the contaminant may be injurious to health. The FDA has one binding
legal limit for a seafood contaminant: polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCB's.'05
The FDA has generally declined to establish more national limits for several
reasons. First, tolerance levels are particularly dicult to determine for con-
taminants because unlike other chemicals, contaminants lack a sponsor who
would perform research and develop data.'06 Second, contaminants tend to be
regional problems, best dealt with on a local, rather than a national, level.
The FDA has another option besides tolerances: it may publish action levels
under 21 C F R. x109 and x509 Action levels are not binding but serve as guid-
ance to states and the FDA in determining whether food is adulterated within
the meaning of the FD&C Act. The FDA has action levels for methyl mercury,
paralytic shellsh poison, and 13 pesticides.  Other pollutants present in water
(such as heavy metals, radioactive wastes and hydrocarbons) apparently do not
pose a threat to human health through shellsh consumption, because shellsh
lack the fatty tissue necessary to store these contaminants.'8 Nevertheless, the
FDA now tests fresh and fresh- frozen clams and oysters for lead, cadmium,
arsenic, chromium and nickel.  In 1993 the FDA
 NSSP Manual 1995 at APD-1.
" 21 U.S.C. x301.
21 C.F.R. x109.30 (1984). See NSSP Manual 1995 at APD-3. See also
Thomas J. Billy.
supra note 57.
" Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57. The FDA does, however, have the
necessary numbers for
paralytic shellsh toxin. James Benson, supra note 50.
' Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
's Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 12.
NSSP Manual 1995 at APD-2. See also Pollution Narrows, supra note 22,
at 12.
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25sponsored a chemical contaminant conference to address the viability of toler-
ance levels for metals but no toxic metal guidelines have been adopted by the
NSSP. Instead, FDA has developed guidance documents to be used by the states
in assessing the public health impact of metals."'
With any foodborne illness, it is dicult to tabulate the actual outbreaks of
infection. Agencies cannot be certain of risks posed by a particular food because
foodborne illness is not always recognized or properly diagnosed; and because
the system for generating and collecting reports on foodborne illness experiences
signicant underreporting. Agencies also cannot compare the relative safety of
dierent foods based on foodborne illness data reported to the CDC, because
the rate of reporting varies from one food type to the next.3 The method of
determining a source of food poisoning is still simple at best. New York State,
for example, requires that any case of food poisoning be reported to health
ocials. The New York State Health Department then attempts to discover
whether an outbreak{ two or more illnesses linked to a common source' 'h{ has
occurred. The Department uses a food specic rate attack table to compare the
number of people who become ill after eating a specic food with the number
of people who became ill and did not eat that food.5 Thus, the state relies on a
mere process of elimination to reveal the contaminated food source. Ironically,
New York State's Department of Health has had the most extensive foodborne
disease surveillance program in the nation since
1980.'
Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
NSSP Manual 1995 at APD-1
Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
lK Id
 Miller, supra note 24.
New York State Department of Health, ShelWsh Related Illness, supra note
23.
 COSMA. supra note 72, at S.
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26Recognizing whether or not an outbreak has occurred becomes even more dif-
cult when data must be coordinated between the many dierent agencies re-
ceiving illness reports. The Active Foodborne Disease Surveillance Network has
ve sentinel sites at state health departments to track foodborne illnesses in
order to determine their common sources; however, the FDA has admitted that
more sites are needed and that they ought to be electronically linked together
in order to identify patterns of illness. In fact, the FDA has declared that in
order to prevent the spread of foodborne disease such an early warning system
is indispensable.7 The FDA has also proposed the creation of a Foodborne Out-
break Response Coordinating Group, which would include representatives from
both state and federal agencies and would further integrate information.8
Until state and federal agencies achieve better coordination and data collec-
tion, we will neither know the true incidence of seafood illness, nor be able to
prevent the spread of those illnesses. Furthermore, science must develop a more
accurate means of discerning the contaminated shellsh in order to stop ban-
ning shellsh that are in fact safe for consumption. Until science makes these
discoveries, regulations will continue to rely on microbiological standards that
produce errors in both directions: they ban safe shellsh, and yet contaminated
shellsh continue to reach the consumer.
" Food Safety, supra note 12.
S Id
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27Chapter Three
1906-1956: In the Beginning
The 1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act9 prohibited the manufacture, interstate
shipment or export of any article of food or drugs which is adulterated or mis-
branded. It was the combined responsibility of the Secretary of Treasury, the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Commerce to make uniform rules
and regulations consistent with the act. Since the denition of adulterated in-
cluded lthy, decomposed or putrid animal or vegetable substance  sea food
would conceiveably be regulated under this statute; however, the success of
this program came into doubt in 1924 when an eruption of typhoid fever pro-
duced 1500 cases of illness, 150 deaths, and was traced to the consumption of
oysters that had been harvested from sewage-contaminated waters " The public-
ity of these illnesses made the public unwilling to purchase oysters. When sales
dropped, the shellsh industry appealed to the Public Health Service to develop
a program that would restore condence in their product.' The formation of
the NSSP a year later is often attributed to this outbreak of typhoid'3; however,
the need for greater control over seafood had already become clear during the
war when the Food Administration had encouraged the consumption of fresh
sh.'4 It is at least certain that the typhoid outbreak engendered new interest
in the monitoring of shellsh.
 Pub L No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) as amended.
ld.
Rep No HRD-84-36 (1984). An earlier typhoid outbreak, which had occurred
in 1910.
was also traced to polluted water. In 1910, raw sewage from a city of 30,000
was being discharged only a few hundred feet away from clam beds. NSSP 1995
at C-9.
Pollution Narrows, supra note 22.
:; Rep No. RCED-88-135 at 10.
' FSA Ann Rep. 535 (1946).
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28In response to the industry's request, the Surgeon General called a conference of
iepresentatives from State and municipal health authorities, State conservation
commissions, the Bureau of Chemistry (later to become the Food and Drug
Administration), the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (now the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service) and the shellsh industry This Conference on Shellsh
Pollution took place in Washington, D.C. on February 19, 1925. The conference
established eight resolutions for the sanitary control of the oyster industry and
created a committee to develop further guidelines as needed. The resolutions
addressed not only the quality of the beds from which oysters were harvested,
but also the packing, shucking, shipping, storing, and displaying of oysters. '
Many of the conference's concerns were then incorporated into the National
Shellsh Sanitation Program (NSSP), which was implemented that same year.
The NSSP is a voluntary, cooperative program that addresses the sanitary con-
trol of fresh and fresh frozen molluscan shellsh (oysters, clams, and mussels)
oered for sale in interstate commerce.27 The NSSP excluded crabs, scallops
and shrimp from regulation on the theory that they are not vulnerable to con-
tamination through the pollution of their beds in the same way as oysters, clams
and mussels.'8 The policies of the NSSP mark a very important change in the
way regulators were thinking about shellsh regulation. Formerly, state agen-
cies were forced to monitor shellsh after harvesting, when contamination had
for the most part already occurred9; the NSSP. however. forbade contaminated
shellsh from being harvested. The NSSP banned harvesting from polluted wa-
ters by setting forth three water quality criteria: rst, water must be suciently
removed from
NSSP Manual 1995 at ix.
' 40 Fed. Reg. 25916, 25917 (1975).
:' 49 Fed. Reg. 31774, 31775 (1984).
Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 10.
Id
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29major sources of pollution so that shellsh are not exposed to fecal contamina-
tion in a quantity dangerous to health; second, the area must be free from even
small quantities of fresh sewage; and third, bacteriological examination may not
ordinarily show coli-aerogenes bacteria in I cc dilution of water.
In a letter dated August 25, 1925, the Surgeon General described the NSSP in
terms of a relationship between the states and the Public Health Service (PHS). '
Attributing the actual regulation of shellsh to the individual state, the Surgeon
General explained that the PHS, aided by the 1925 Conference Committee,
merely acts to coordinate the regulation. The PHS' particular role was to survey
the states and publish reports on the eectiveness of the state control programs.
This fact gathering was rst compiled in a Report of Committee on Sanitary
Control of Shellsh Industry in the United States on November 6, 1925, as a
supplement to the Public Health Reports. Later, this report would be replaced
by a program endorsement concept, under which the PHS evaluated each state's
compliance with the Manual of Recommended Practice for Sanitary Control of
the Shellsh Industry.'3 The NSSP also published a list of all shellsh shippers
certied by those States having 'satisfactory' control programs.'33
The NSSP continues today as a tripartite cooperative program, made up of
shellsh-producing states, the FDA, and the shellsh industry. Seven foreign
countries also participate through agreements signed with the PHS and the
FDA.' The FDA administers the NSSP, but
NSSP Manual 1995 at C-4.
49 Fed Reg 31774, 31775 (1984).
The program endorsement concept arose in 1946 with Public Health Bulletin
No. 295.
Intervening was the 'L'S. Public Health Service Minimum Requirement for
Approval of States Shellsh Control Measures and Certication for Shippers in
Interstate Commerce (Revised October 1937).
' 40 Fed. Reg. 25916, 25917 (1975). See also Supplement No. 53 to Public
Health Reports, November 6, 1925 Report of Committee on Sanitary Control
of Shellsh Industry in the United States.
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30the states must create laws providing themselves with adequate legal basis for
the sanitary control of all interstate phases of the shellsh industry.'35 Each
NSSP member has particular responsibilities: the states identify pollution, test
water for bacteriological quality, patrol growing areas, certify shellsh plants,
conduct laboratory experiments and ensure that shellsh are harvested and
processed under sanitary conditions; the FDA reviews state programs (in order
to evaluate conformity with NSSP) and suggests improvement; and the industry
agrees to harvest and produce under sanitary conditions, including the use of
tags and records to monitor the origin and disposition of shellsh.'36 The NSSP
publication today is called the National Shellsh Sanitation Program Manual
of Operations. This two-volume manual provides guidance to states in creating
shellsh laws and regulations. The FDA also uses the NSSP Manual as a basis
to certify foreign shellsh sanitation programs.  The manual addresses general
administrative procedures, laboratory procedures, and guidelines for growing
area survey and classication, controlled relaying, patrol of shellsh harvesting
areas and control of harvesting, and acquaculture.'38 Thus, the creation of the
NSSP in 1925 set the stage for what may be today the most important regulatory
vehicle in the history of shellsh.
On June 22, 1934, the 1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act was amended by
adding Section I OA, applying to seafood. ' This amendment was probably in
response to diculties with
50 Fed. Reg. 7797 (1985); 54 Fed.Reg. 7281 (1989).
' NSSP Manual 1995 at A-I.
' 4OFed Reg.25916(1975).
'' NSSP Manual 1995 at xv.
138 Introduction to online NSSP Manual of Operation, FDAICFSAN 1995,
available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda. govb|ear/nsspman html In 1982 the Interstate Shellsh
Sanitation
conference was established. Today, the NSSP Manual is updated at the ISSC's
annual conference.
with input from the State Shellsh Authority, shellsh industry, and federal
regulatory agencies
such as FDA, NMFS and EPA
' Pub.L No. 451, 48 Stat 1204.
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31decomposition of shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico Area.' The new section gave
the Secretary of Agriculture discretion to examine and inspect all premises,
equipment, methods, materials, containers and labels used in the production
of seafood upon application by the packer of seafood. The applicant had to
pay a fee, and upon passing inspection, was authorized to mark the seafood as
conforming to federal regulations. This section was amended only a year later,
on August 27, 1935.'' The basic provision remained the same, but the amend-
ment potentially expanded the application of the statute because it empowered
the Secretary to inspect any seafood within the jurisdiction of this act, rather
than limiting inspection to only the sea food sold in interstate commerce. The
1935 amendment also may require the applicant to ax the mark, and may
charge fees not only to cover expenses but also to provide, equip and maintain
an adequate and ecient inspection service. Furthermore, the Secretary can
use the receipts from these fees toward salaries of additional inspectors when
necessary to supplement the number of inspectors for whose salaries Congress
has appropriated. Finally, the amendment authorized the Secretary to promul-
gate regulations establishing the sanitary and other conditions under which the
service herein shall be granted and maintained.
When the 1906 Federal Food and Drug Act was replaced by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,' Section bA.. was the only provision
not repealed.'43 Rather, Section IOA was amended to become x702A (21 U.S.C.
x372A),' later to be renumbered as x706 (21 U.S.C. x376).' Section 706.
which is still in eect today, is basically identical to
55 Fed. Reg. 26334. 26337 (1990).
Pub. L. No. 346,49 Stat. 871.
 21 U.S.C. x301.
' Peter Barton Hutt & Richard Merrill, Food & Drug Law, 267 (1991).
'' PubL No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4498 (1992)
' Pub. L No. 103-80, x3(dd)(2), 107 Stat. 779 (1993).
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32Section 1 OA as promulgated in 1935. The earlier version had authorized in-
spections by the Secretary of Agriculture, because in 1935 the FDA was a part
of the U.S Department of Agriculture. The amendment to Section 706 deleted
the words of Agriculture because by that time the FDA had become part of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HI-IS). More importantly, the
survival of Section 1 QA means that the FDA has had continuous power to
inspect shellsh since the rst act in 1906.
With the enactment of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act in I944,' the
FDA acquired further regulatory power The PHS Act authorizes regulations
that prevent the spread of communicable diseases. The FDA also has some
power to protect against insanitary food conditions at the retail level. The 1906
Act forbade any person to sell or oer for sale adulterated foods received from
interstate shipment,  and Section 331(k) of the 1938 Act prohibits any act
if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the rst
sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being
adulterated or misbranded The FDA has not in fact established regulations
for restaurants, food vendors or retail food stores: instead, the FDA develops
model codes and ordinances to be enforced by state and local agencies. The
use of model legislation began with the PHS, when it prepared a Food Service
Sanitation Ordinance in 193 548 In 1957, the PHS added a Vending of Food
and Beverages Ordinance, and later the FDA contributed its own Retail Food
Store Sanitation Code.'49 Although the FDA once considered converting these
model ordinances into regulations, lack of enforcement resources and general
opposition convinced the agency to leave regulation of
 42 U.S.C. x201. 58 Stat. 682; Regulations to Control Communicable
Diseases 42 U S.C x264, 58 Stat. 703.
x2, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), as amended.
 Hutt, supra note 143, at 268.
' Id.
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33the retail sector to the states.'0 Nevertheless, the combination of the FD&C
Act and the PHS Act has paved the way for the FDA to become a strong force
in the control of seafood safety.'5'
Not long after the FDA acquired additional regulatory authority under the
PHS Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMIFS) of the Department of
Commerce also acquired a role in shellsh safety. The NMIFS is charged with
conserving, managing, developing and protecting living marine resources that
depend upon healthy and productive marine and estuarine habitats Under the
Agriculture Marketing Act of 1946's the NTvIFS operates a voluntary fee-for-
service inspection program.' Regulations are codied in 50 C.F.R. xx260-266,
which develop names and standards for grades of sh. In the Fish and Wildlife
Act of l9561 the Director of the Budget transferred all duties pertaining to
sh, shellsh and any products thereof to the Department of the Interior. This
transfer actually encompassed those duties performed by the Department of
Agriculture under the Agriculture Marketing Act of 1946.156 Nonetheless, the
NMIFS continued to operate its voluntary program that includes inspection,
grading, and certication. as well as the use of ocial marks to indicate whether
a product has been federally inspected. In 1990, the NMFS program covered
about twelve percent of seafood consumed in this country, and nine percent of
edible shery exports.
Id. The FDA later combined all of the model ordinances and codes into a
single Food Protection Unicode.
55 FedReg. 26334 (1990)
Rep No. RCED-88-135.
Pub L No. 733, 60 Stat. 1082, as amended in 7 U.S.C x 1622
Hutt, supra note 143, at 1332.
Pub L No. 1024, 70 Stat. 1119 (16 U.S.C. x742(e)).
Later, Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970 (84 Stat. 2090) transferred these
functions back
to the Department of Commerce.
' 55 Fed. Reg. 26334 (1990) In 1983, NIvS covered 18% of seafood
consumed and I
in 1987. Hutt, supra note 143, at 268.
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34From the NMFS program onward, the subject of shellsh produced much scien-
tic discussion. The PHS created the Public Health Service Shellsh Sanitation
Laboratory in 1948, in order to provide a forum for conducting bacteriological
studies on the problems of shellsh sanitation. In 1955, an annual publica-
tion called The National Shellsh Proceedings focused much attention on the
laboratory's latest discoveries. That year, the Shellsh Proceedings printed a
Convention Symposium on Pollution Control in Shellsh Growing Areas. The
symposium was arranged by Acting Chief of the PHS Shellsh Sanitation Sec-
tion, Eugene T. Jensen.'58 One study revealed a correlation between the pres-
ence of indicator organisms and pathogens. Another discovered that Salmonella
could survive in shellsh from harvest until the time of consumption. Because
soft clams could not survive transplantation from polluted to clean harvesting
beds, the laboratory had sought an alternate method of cleaning polluted clams;
the result was articial purication, which entailed immersing shellsh in clean
water. ' The 1953 study believed that its new purication method could reduce
Salmonella to indeterminate levels within 48 hours. A more sobering conclusion
was that shellsh are vectors of enteric disease organisms and have the ability
quickly to reect the sanitary condition of their acquatic environment.'6' In
1953, the PHS Shellsh Sanitation Laboratory was transferred from Wood's
Hole. Massachusetts to Pensacola, Florida so that further studies could be per-
formed in a warmer environment. The PHS created a Shellsh Advisory Panel
to help develop a research program for the new laboratory.
One year later, in 1954, the First National Shellsh Sanitation Workshop
was held in Washington, D.C. It is this workshop that supported dividing the
NSSP Manual into the two
C B Kelly, Public Health Service Research on Shelsh Bacteriology, Na-
tional Shellsh
Proceedings, 1955, at 21.
' This depuration method is still used today.
' C.B. Kelly, supra note 158, at 25.
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35volumes that appeared in 1957 and 1959. For many years the FDA continued to
sponsor National Shellsh Sanitation Workshops as an invaluable resource for
revisions to the NSSP Manual.'6' Thus, the years between 1906 and 1956 present
a recurring theme: the problems with shellsh required more investigation{ and
more structured supervision. The FD&C Act and the PHS Act formally dele-
gated power to the FDA, but the Workshops, the NSSP and the NMFS played
equally important roles in identifying obstacles to shellsh safety. Finally, by
turning the attention of the scientic eld to shellsh sanitation, the govern-
ment prompted discoveries crucial to the regulatory measures in place today.
A survey of the rst fty years of shellsh regulation reveals the very building
blocks that shaped regulations for the next fty years.
NSSP Manual 1995 at xii. Additional workshops have taken place in 1956,
1958,1961 1964, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1975 and 1977. Idat xiii.
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36Chapter Four
1956-1980: Shifting Sands
The years from 1956 to 1980 form a roller-coaster ride of decreasing and in-
creasing shellsh regulation. Under then-Section 702A, for example, the FDA
had added regulations for the inspection of canned oysters in 1944.6: In 1957,
however, only two canneries operated under Section 702A'63 and at the end of
the year the entire voluntary inspection service was discontinued. ' In contrast,
less than a decade later another regulation set forth the specics of inspecting
and certifying shery products, codied at 50 C.F.R. x260.6S While the ad-
ministrative agencies were vacillating on the issue of inspections, the legislative
branch was also toying with the idea of regulation. Several Congressional hear-
ings evaluated proposals to establish a continuous factory inspection program
for sh similar to those established for meat, poultry and eggs.'66 Proposals
included the Fishery Products Protection Act of 1967 and the Wholesome Fish
& Fishery Products Act of 1969.'
Between 1957 and 1962 the PHS distributed four publications containing
recommended practices for sanitary control of shellsh.'08 The PHS also created
a manual on the Appraisal of
21 C.F.R. x85 et seq. (1944). See 55 Fed. Reg. 26334, 26337 (1990). When
the voluntary inspection program was re-enacted in 1977, it was redesignated
as 21 C.F.R. x 197. '' Hutt, supra note 143, at 268.
22 FedReg 891,22 Fed. Reg. 3841 (1957). See a/so 55 Fed Reg. 26334, 26337
(1990).
Inspection and Certication of Establishments and Fishery Products for Hu-
man Consumption, 31 Fed. Reg 16052 (Dec. 15, 1966) as amended 36 Fed. Reg.
21037 (Nov. 3, 1971), codied at 50 C.F.R. x260.
'' Hutt supra note 143, at 268. ' Rep No. RCED-88-135.
1957 Manual of Recommended Practice for Sanitary Control of the Shellsh
Industry (Part II: Sanitation of the Harvesting and Processing of Shellsh).
Printed as Part II of Public Health Service Publication No. 33.
1959 Manual of recommended Practice for Sanitary Control of the Shellsh
Industry
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37State Shellsh Sanitation Programs.'9 The Shellsh Sanitation Workshops of
1961 and 1964 reviewed and revised this draft manual, and published a two-
volume NSSP Manual in 1965 that greatly resembles the NSSP Manual used
today.'70 In determining nal revisions, the FDA relied not only on previous
manuals but also on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules and regula-
tions dealing with water pollution and shellsh waters. By incorporating EPA
rules, the FDA produced a manual that places great emphasis on water quality
and preharvest sanitation. The voluntary procedures stipulated in the manual
are still currently used by the Food and Drug Administration in meeting its
agreed-upon responsibilities under NSSP
The decade's biggest step in the direction of shellsh regulation was the
Reorganization Orders of 1968. In the Reorganization Orders the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare'73 designated the FDA as the principle federal
agency responsible for shellsh regulation, thereby transferring regulatory power
from the PHS to the FDA.'7' Since 1968, the FDA has cooperated with the NSSP
and has followed its Manual of Operations, but some have contended that the
1968 change of power produced a change in philosophy, moving from the more
cooperative relationship established by the PHS, to an enforcement-oriented
program run by the
(Part I: Sanitation of Shellsh Growing Areas) Printed as Part I of Public
Health Service Publication No. 33.
1962: Cooperative Program for the Certication of Interstate Shellsh Ship-
pers, Part II, Sanitation of the Harvesting and Processing of Shellsh. (Printed
as Part II of Public Health Service Publication No. 33)
1962 Cooperative Program for the Certication of Interstate Shellsh Ship-
pers, Part I, Sanitation of Shellsh Growing Areas. (Printed as Part I of Public
Health Service Publication No.
33).
'' 40 FedReg. 25916, 25918 (1975).
National Shellsh Sanitation Program Manual of Operations Part I, Sani-
tation of Shellsh Growing Areas, Public Health Service Publication No. 33..
Revised 1965.
NSSP Manual 1995 at xiv. These EPA regulations appear at 40 C.F.R. xx400
et seq. m 40 Fed Reg. 25916. 25919 (1975).
NSSP Manual 1995 at xiii.
' 33 Fed.Reg. 9909 (1968) (codied in 21 C.F.R. x2.120).
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38FD.-n Indeed, the FDA has authority under the FD&C Act to make and
enforce regulations regarding the sanitation of shellsh that enter interstate
commerce.'76 Generally, however, the FDA has relied upon the NSSP and its
policymaking process to ensure shellsh safety.177 Both the FD&C Act and the
PHS Act permit the FDA to accept assistance from the states,'78 but some crit-
icize this federal-state interaction as an uneasy relationship. The NSSP seeks
state compliance through the monthly publication of the Interstate Certied
Shellsh Shippers List (ICSSL), which catalogues whether a state's safety pro-
gram is endorsed. Withdrawal of endorsement penalizes a state, because any
state who participates in the NSSP will not accept uncertied shellsh How-
ever, under its voluntary agreement with the NSSP, the FDA lacks unilateral
power to remove an individual shipper from the endorsement list. Because of its
reliance on the NSSP, the FDA has not been inspecting shellsh rms for viola-
tions of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, nor has it initiated any Federal
regulatory actions against State certied shellsh shippers. To make matters
worse, the FDA cannot control the growing area from which shellsh are har-
vested because its authority is limited to products in interstate shipment.'5'
Nevertheless, the Reorganization Orders of 1968 marked an enormous step in
centralizing the responsibility for shellsh safety.
The year 1970 brings this fteen year time period back full circle with the
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970,'' which transferred the regulatory power
held by the Department of the Interior under the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956
back to the Department of Commerce. The same
Rep No HRD-84-36 at 43.
21 U S.C. x301.
 40 Fed Reg. 25916, 25919 (1975).
' 21 U.S.C. x372, 52 Stat. 1056 (1938); 42 U.S.C. x243, 58 Stat. 693
(1944).
17Q 40 Fed. Reg. 25916, 25919 (1975). Rep No. HRD-84-36 at 3.
84 Stat. 2090
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39Reorganization plan also established the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) under the Department of Commerce. The NOAA plays
a role in seafood safety because some of its duties include mapping coastal and
estuarine waters and managing and conserving shery resources in conjunction
with the states. The NOAA has the authority to close Federal waters to shing
whenever oil spills, toxic blooms or other phenomena threaten to impact the
safety of the  The NO uses FDA safety standards when operating its vol-
untary fee-for- service inspection program for seafood processors. Furthermore,
three of the NOAA's components{ the NMFS, the National Ocean Service and
the Oce of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research{ have particular programs af-
fecting seafood safety. ' The Reorganization Plan of 1970 also added x260.1
to the already-existing inspection program at 50 C.F.R. x260. Section 260.1
grants to the Secretary of Commerce the power to administer regulations re-
garding inspection and certication of shery products, except as he delegates
such functions to the NMFS ''
The uneasy federal-state relationship created by the NSSP nally erupted
in a court battle in 1972. The state of Virginia challenged the authority of the
FDA and the NSSP to enforce certication of state control programs. Unhappy
with an unsatisfactory shellsh program rating, the state questioned the FDA's
authority to impose FD&C Act sanctions on a state who shipped shellsh after
its program had been decertied by the NSSP. Since the NSSP is voluntary, the
probability of a court upholding sanctions seemed unlikely, and the Department
of HI-IS' Oce of General Counsel wrote a memorandum inquiring as to the
legal status of the NSSP. The battle resulted in FDA's conclusion that it had
no authority to decertify a state since the NSSP had never been formerly [sic]
adopted under the Federal Administrative Process Act.' ''
is: Dr Michael Friedman, supra note 11.
'' Rep No. RCED- 88-135.
' 36Fed. Reg 21037(1971). codiedin 50C.F.Rx260.1.
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40Despite Virginia's challenge to the FDA, the general cry for formal regulation of
shellsh seemed to be growing in volume. The General Accounting Oce (GAO)
published a study in 1973 that found severe problems with the system of shellsh
regulation.'86 Shellsh that failed to meet NSSP standards continued to reach
the consumer market, the states neither ensured the harvesting of shellsh from
sanitary waters nor prevented illegal harvesting, and violative shellsh were
almost never traced to their source. The GAO's horror stories provided an
excellent basis for the Commissioner to suggest the need for formal regulation;
thus, on January 14, 1975, the Commissioner announced the prepublication
draft, open for comment, of a proposal to strengthen the NSSP.'87
In the meantime, two events occurred: rst, the FDA and the NMFS ex-
ecuted a memorandum of understanding (MOU);'88 and second, 21 C.F.R.
x1240.60 codied the prohibition against interstate transport of any shellsh
that might contribute to communicable disease.'69 Under the MOU between
the NMFS and the FDA, NMFS inspections will ensure that an industry par-
ticipant complies not only with NMIFS' own requirements but also with the
requirements of the FD&C Act. The 21 C F.R. x 1240 regulation prohibited
transport of shellsh handled or stored in such an insanitary manner, or grown
in an area so contaminated as to render the shellsh a likely agent in spreading
disease. The codication of this ban was particularly signicant because it was
the rst episode of shellsh regulation promulgated in the
 Rep No HIRD-84-36 at 43.
'' GAO, Protecting the Consumer from Potentially Harmful Shellsh (Clams,
Mussels, and Oysters) Rep. No. B-164031(2) (March 29, 1973).
' 4OFed.Reg. 25916, 25921 (1975).
40 Fed. Reg. 3025 (1975).
' 40 FedReg. 25916, 25918 (1975), codied in 21 C.F.R x1240.60.
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41federal register instead of relying on the cooperative- voluntary eorts of State
regulatory agencies and the shellsh industry.'
Perhaps elated by the success of2l C.F.R. x 1240, the FDA published pro-
posed regulations for mandatory control of shellsh the following summer.'9'
The June 19, 1975 regulations left primary enforcement of shellsh safety re-
quirements to the states; however, they also endorsed the power of the FDA to
enforce compliance under the FD&C and PHS Acts, and they specically per-
mitted the FDA to prosecute individual rms who failed to comply with good
manufacturing practices. The FDA retained its former authority to withdraw
endorsement of a state program, but the proposed regulations would obviate
the need to use withdrawal as anything other than a last resort. The proposed
regulations addressed the earlier concerns about tracing violative shellsh by
increasing the tagging requirements. The proposition also incorporated com-
ments that had been made in response to the earlier draft; for example, since
other regulations were being developed to provide federally enforceable controls
on the marketing of perishable food, the revision deleted its own requirements
for shellsh market control
Apparently because of considerable confUsion about the intent and interpre-
tation of the proposed regulations, the Commissioner later announced that he
would revise the June regulations and reissue them for comment,'9 but he never
succeeded in reissuing these regulations. A 1984 GAO report summarized the
episode as an attempt to formalize proposed regulations that was withdrawn
because of opposition, ' but the abandonment of the regulations can also be
specically attributed to antipathy of Congress.'4 In the Bauman Amendments
to the
' Id
Id at 25921.
 40 Fed. Reg. 58883 (1975).
' Rep. No HIRD-84-36
' See, e.g., Hutt, supra note 143, at 1317: [B]efore it could be revised by
the FDA
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42Coastal Zone Management Act of l976,' Congress prohibited the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare (and, therefore, the FDA) from promulgating
nal regulations concerning the national shellsh safety program before June 30,
1977.' Furthermore, if the FDA were to create such regulations, it rst had to
conduct an economic analysis of the regulations' impact on the shellsh indus-
try and a cost-benet analysis of the proposed NSSP. Finally, and somewhat
ironically, this period of upheaval closed with a regulation that merely continued
the former procedures for inspection of canned oysters: the voluntary inspection
program that had been discontinued in 1957 was revised and redesignated as 21
C.F R. xl97.''
Congress acted to postpone the proposal; Peter Barton Hutt, 199S- An
Overview of the Last 50 Years, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 197 (1995) In 1977 Congress
passed the rst of several laws precluding FDA from controlling shellsh.
Pub L No. 94-370, x16 B, 90 Stat.1013.
Id at 1033.
C7 42 Fed. Reg 14303, 42 Fed Reg 14661 (1977). In 1996, the cannery
inspection under 21 C.F.R. x197 was again discontinued. 61 Fed. Reg. 27779
(1996).
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43Chapter Five
The Eighties and The Outbreaks
The Commissioner's failed attempt to establish formal regulations in no way di-
minished general interest in the monitoring of seafood safety. In its report Need
to Assess Quality of V S -Produced Seafood for Domestic and Foreign Consump-
tion, the GAO concluded that the variable quality of U.S. seafoods contributed
to the low volume of seafood consumed domestically and exported.'98 The re-
port recommended that the Administrator of the NOAA perform a study to
assess the quality of U.S. seafood. When it appeared that the project would not
be funded, the GAO issued a second report, Followup on the National Marine
Fisheries Service's Eorts to Assess the Quality of U.S-Produced Seafood.'
The second report reiterated the importance of conducting a study on seafood.
It also suggested that the industry and the NT'VIIF S formulate a grading sys-
tem for sh quality and establish price dierentials as a means of rewarding
shermen for high quality sh.
A triumph in the regulation of shellsh occurred with the Lacey Act Amend-
ments of 1981,  which permit any federal agency to enforce the prohibition
against buying, selling or transporting any sh, wildlife or plants possessed or
taken in violation of any law, treaty or regulation. Although this amendment
authorized the FDA to initiate enforcement action, it is actually the NMFS who
is now responsible for the control of illegally taken molluscan shellsh. due to
an MOU created between the NMFS and the FDA in 1986.: Still, the most
successful operations have involved the NMFS and FDA working together to
prove Lacey Act violations
' Rep. No. CED-81-20 (Oct 15, 1980).
Rep No CED-81-125 (Jun. 22 1981)
16 USC. x3371 (1981).
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In 1987, the NMFS and FDA formed a joint operation against illegal har-
vesting that had become rampant in Louisiana, Florida and South Carolina.
One FDA investigator estimated that 20% of shellsh leaving Louisiana were
harvested from polluted waters, and one South Carolina dealer allegedly sold
more than one million dollars worth of illegally obtained clams in a vear!'3 Be-
cause there are three and a half million acres of shellsh growing waters in
Louisiana alone, the state's small patrol force was unable to solve the boot-
legging The FDA and NMIFS thus launched a full scale undercover operation:
federal agents were joined by the Florida Department of Natural Resources,
Florida Marine Patrol, Louisiana State Police, South Carolina Wildlife and Ma-
rine Resources Division, and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control. The U.S. Coast Guard provided air ights over the
illegal waters to track the harvesters. Federal agents posed as sherman and
attempted to sell untagged oysters to the dealers who were suspected of trading
in illegal harvests. During the sale, the undercover agents indicated that the
oysters had come from illegal waters, providing the FDA with documentation
that dealers purchased sacks of untagged oysters and sacks of oysters believed
to be from closed waters. Each violation of the Lacey Act carries a $20,000 ne,
up to ve years in jail and parallel state law violations. Y)-1 The federal agen-
cies targeted the dealers in the hope that by destroying the market for illegally
harvested shellsh they would discourage sherman from illegal harvesting.
The 1981 triumph of the Lacey Act was followed by another step forward
in shellsh regulation with the formation of the Interstate Shellsh Sanitation
Conference (ISSC) on Sept 21,
Rep. No RCED-88-135.
Dale Blumenthal, Catching Fish in All the Wrong Places, FDA Consumer,
Feb. 1989 at 22. The operation was so large that it involved three separate
undercover investigations, code-named PEARL in Louisiana, STOP in Florida,
and SPONGE in South Carolina. Id. at 23.
Id.
16 U.S.C. x3371 (1981).
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1982 The participants of the ISSC include regulatory ocials from twenty-
two states, the FDA, the NMFS and members of the shellsh industry. The pur-
pose of the voluntary program is to provide a medium through which state regu-
latory ocials can establish updated guidelines and procedures for the uniform
application of those guidelines for sanitary control of the shellsh industry.05
The rst annual meeting was held in August 1983, at which the ISSC adopted
the NSSP Manual and various administrative procedures necessary to modify
the manual On March 30, 1984 the 1-Il-IS published notice of an agreement be-
tween the FDA and the ISSC. The agreement essentially arms the continued
exchange of information between the agencies regarding state compliance with
shellsh sanitation programs. The FDA consents to evaluate shellsh sanitary
control programs and report its ndings to the ISSC7'6 publish revisions to the
NSSP Manual of Operation'07 and provide technical assistance to the 155C08
The promised revisions to the Manual of Operation have taken place nearly
every year since 19867's
The 1980's contain further evidence of the increased interest in seafood
safety. In 1982, the Seafood Technology Division was established within the
Institute of Food Technologists (IFT))' lET is, in turn, a nonprot scientic
society devoted to the discovery and application of knowledge to improve the
world's food supply. The Seafood Division takes advantage of the forum already
established by IFT in order to bring attention to seafood issues. By 1996 the
Seafood Division had acquired more than 625 members from academia, industry
and government.
49 Fed. Reg. 12751, 12752 (1984).
- Id.
:r, 49Fed. Reg. 31774, 31775 (1984).
54 Fed Reo 7'8l (1989'i
 NSSP Manual 1995 at iii. Revisions occurred each year from 1986 to
1990, then again in
1992, 1993 and 1995. Id.
Seafood Network Information Center, Institute of Food Technologists, Seafood
Technology Division, UC Davis, available at. http: //ift.mcrine.com/ di-
visions! seafood! member. htm?L+mystore-'44
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The Seafood Division's objectives include: encouraging cooperation between
IFT members in industry, government and academia who work with seafood
products; fostering symposia regarding seafood science and technology; and
stimulating and assisting pertinent research and development in seafood tech-
nology.
Several illness outbreaks occurred between 1982 and 1983, and many re-
sponded by demanding federal involvement. In 1982 at least 471 persons be-
came ill after consumption of sewage-contaminated oysters. It was discovered
that the combination of raw sewage bypasses, high rainfall, strong winds, and
low tides caused contamination of water that was classied as approved under
NSSP standards.:11 The NSSP Manual suggests that, had the water been clas-
sied as conditionally approved, the required monitoring would have prevented
the outbreak. Additionally, a survey of the quality of shellsh tagging in New
York retail establishments at that time revealed that 14% of the establishments
were selling improperly tagged or untagged clams7 In December 1982, over 250
more illnesses associated with clams and oysters occurred. Because the out-
break was severe in Long Island, the New York State Department of Health
(DOH) issued three advisories warning against the consumption of raw clams
and oysters)'3 The DOH also proposed to embargo shipments from any state
whose clams were veried as causing illness. The consumer public, formerly slow
to react, began to avoid purchasing clams. Nevertheless, local Baymen main-
tained that clams were not responsible for the illnesses; the Baymen blamed
other foods, the u, and the DOH for making accusations it could not prove)'4
Finally, in early 1983 a meeting between the FDA, six shellsh-interested states,
the CDC and the ISSC convened in
NSSP 1995 at C-14.
Becker, supra note 6, at 21-22.
Id.
 Id at 24.
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Albany, NY to discuss a regional solution to the shellsh problem. The
group rejected the DOH's proposed embargo, instead deciding that interstate
sanitary control required greater federal participation.
This cycle{ proposal by the state, rejection by the industry and request for
federal help{repeated itself when the New York DOH suggested banning the sale
of raw shellsh. Such a ban would devastate the New York shellsh industry,
where an estimated 70 to 80% of hard clams are sold to restaurants and 70 to
80% of those clams are eaten raw)'S At the request of several Baymen's groups
and the Suolk County Hard Clam Advisory Group, a workshop was convened
to develop alternatives to the DOH's ban. The workshop observed that most
outbreaks were attributed to illegally harvested shellsh, but until diggers were
convinced of the real threat to human health, poaching would not be eliminated,
One recommendation was to adopt national strategies and standards for the
harvest, distribution and marketing of shellsh.
In 1983, after 750 New Yorkers became ill from eating raw clams, Con-
gressman Thomas J. Downey requested that the GAO examine the FDA's role
in regulating the interstate shellsh industry. On June 14, 1984, the GAO
published Problems in Protecting Consumers from Illegally Harvested Shellsh
(Clams, Mussels, and Oysters). :6 The report concluded that although the
FDA reviews state programs and suggests improvements, it has no enforcement
authority to ensure adherence to program guidelines. The report went on to
identify three basic weaknesses in the current system: shortage of enforcement
sta little deterrent eect of penalties; and inability to trace contaminated shell-
sh  The situation in New York conrms the GAO's
:1s COSMA, supra note 72, at 6.
 Rep. No HRD-84-36 (1984).
:  The GAO was not alone in identifying these weaknesses. See also
COSMA, supra note 72 at 12; Becker, supra note 6, at 12; SCPD supra note
14, at 47.
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48conclusions. The state has 1.1 million acres of shellsh- growing waters, mainly
located in Suolk and Nassau counties of Long Island. About seventeen percent
of those waters (190,000 acres) are closed to harvesting, but only twelve environ-
mental conservation ocers patrol the entire area. In other states, these same
conservation ocers must also perform search and rescue, boating safety and
drug enforcement. The penalties for illegal harvesting range from conscation,
to a ne of $500, to six months in jail; however, the most common ne in 1981
and 1982 was only $25, and inadequate facilities made conscation impossible.
In the 1983 outbreak, the contaminated clams could not be traced because the
tags were altered and mutilated, however, even without mistagging, accurate
tracing is impossible because dealers commingle dierent shellsh stocks, and
the preprinted tags often just name a prime harvesting area such as the Great
South Bay. The GAO report concluded with an evaluation of three proposed
solutions: rst, to leave regulation to the states with the FDA as an advisor;
second, to grant authority to the FDA to regulate; and third, to create a cooper-
ative relationship between the states, the FDA and industry. The report praised
the third cooperative option for its similarity to the IS SC, and expressed the
hope that the ISSC would alleviate current problems. The HHS concurred with
the GAO's conclusion)'8
The FDA also endorsed the GAO's conclusion, citing the GAO report when
it withdrew its earlier proposed regulations in I 985.19 The agency explained
that economic analysis had revealed the regulations to be prohibitively expen-
sive, especially since the GAO report demonstrated that the benets of such
regulations were insignicant. The FDA announced that it would adopt the
rst and third options of the report by continuing to participate in the NSSP
and
:18 Rep No. HRD-84-36 at 20 (1984).
:i 50 Fed Reg. 7797 (1985).
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49by cooperating with the ISSC under their memorandum of understanding. Thus,
the regulation of seafood continued much as it had before; in October, a bill
was proposed that would have provided authority for testing for pathogens and
chemicals in seafood:20 and the NOAA began to develop a plan for a seafood
surveillance system model. As the FDA had promised, the NSSP manual was
revised in 1989, as it had been in 1984.1
In 1986 the New England Journal of Medicine published several reports
commenting on the shellsh-related outbreak of epidemic proportions that had
occurred in 1982.222 The Journal calculated that within an eight month period,
over 1000 persons in New York State suered gastroenteritis from eating raw
shellsh. Of the 1017 people who became ill, 813 cases were related to eating
raw clams and 204 to eating oysters74 Although bacteriological analysis of shell-
sh and stool samples failed to disclose the cause of the illness, the Norwalk
virus was believed to be responsible. The study concluded that the magnitude,
persistence, and widespread nature of these outbreaks raise further questions
about the safety of consuming raw shellsh.5 In an interesting twist on the
issue, the study revealed that 26% of persons who became ill had eaten only
steamed clams, which indicated that under practical eld conditions, tempera-
tures used to steam clams are often insucient to inactivate pathogens and to
eliminate the risk of illness.6 The study echoed a common refrain of the GAO
reports: inadequate or absent
Rep. No RCED-88-135 at 12 (Senate bill 1813 of Oct. 23, 1987).
54 Fed. Reg. 7281 (1989) and 49 Fed. Reg. 31774 (1984).
Dale L. Morse et al., Widespread Outbreaks of Clam- and Oyster- Associated
Gastroenteritis, Role of Norwalk J Thus; 314 New Eng J. Med. 678 (1986).
::3 DuPont, supra note 29, at 707.
2:4 Morse et al, supra note 222.
{ Id.
Id. at 680. Clams are commonly cooked until their shells open which usually
occurs after
one minute of steaming. However, it takes four to six minutes of steaming
in order for the internal temperature of the clam to reach levels necessary to
inactivate a virus. See also DuPont, supra note 29, at 708. Another statistic is
that 7 to 13 percent of poliovirus organisms added to
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50shipping tags made the source of shellsh dicult to trace. The study noted
that although the outbreaks occurring in 1983, 1984 and 1985 did not reach the
epidemic of 1982, the persistence of outbreaks demonstrated that the problem
had not abated. The Journal oered one explanation:
the study of enteric virology is in its infancy; therefore, we lack the science
to detect pathogenic viruses in water, shellsh or patients. ::7
In 1988, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and
Monetary Aairs asked the GAO to gather information on the nature, extent
and seriousness of seafood safety problems, thereby prompting the second GAO
report on seafood within four years. The report, GAO, Seafood Safety: Serious-
ness of Problems and Eorts to Protect Consumers concluded that there does
not appear to be a compelling case at this time for implementing a compre-
hensive mandatory federal seafood inspection program similar to that used for
meat and poultry. ,::s The GAO emphasized the healthy interaction between
the agencies that share the responsibility for seafood safety, and minimized the
weaknesses of the system in place. For example, the GAO dismissed the fact
that 29% of samples tested by the FDA did not comply with federal regula-
tions for contaminants and labelling, because 78% of the noncompliant samples
did not pose a direct threat to humans.::; The GAO determined that the data
did not indicate a widespread problem with American seafood, that under the
current system, state and federal agencies provided adequate monitoring, and
that a mandatory seafood inspection progam was inappropriate to solve existing
problems with shellsh sanitation.
oysters survive 8 to 30 minutes when cooked according to various commonly
used methods.
Morse et al, supra note 222 at 680.
{ DuPont, supra note 29, at 708.
Rep. No. RCED- 88-135 at 5 (Aug. 10, 1988).
Id. at 3
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51Chapter Six
The Nineties
December 18, 1997 was the eective date for new, mandatory regulations re-
garding seafood. The new regulations are based on the Hazard Analysis Crit-
ical Control Point method (HACCP){ an outlook far dierent from previous
theories of shellsh sanitation. The HACCP regulations have generated great
excitement, and any discussion from a post-1997 viewpoint must be careful lest
the recent regulations overshadow other important events that have taken place
during this decade. Therefore, this chapter will discuss all of the events occur-
ring in the nineties except for the new HACCP regulations, leaving a detailed
analysis of HACCP for later chapters.
In the early nineties, concern about seafood safety hit a feverish pitch among
consumers. The press seized hold of the outbreaks in seafood related illness and
soon shellsh safety was a public concern. In one year, four newspapers and two
television programs cited the statistic that eating sh was 25 times more likely to
make you ill than dining on beef and 16 times more likely than downing poultry
or pork.  Two states, Louisiana and California, began to require notices similar
to the warnings on cigarettes, telling consumers that eating raw oysters may
pose a risk to one's health)' Other states had already considered banning the
consumption of raw shellsh. The industry and regulatory authorities were
forced to respond.
Miller, supra note 24, at 7.
Id. at 8. Louisiana required the following wherever raw oysters are sold or on
tags of sacks of unshucked oysters: Warning: consumption of raw oysters can
cause serious illness in persons with liver, stomach, blood or immune system
disorders. For more information, consult your physician. California required
retail establishements to display a similar warning on signs. menus, table tents,
or other visible places at point of sale. Id.
New York, for example, proposed banning the sale of raw shellsh. COSMA,
supra note
72
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52FDA representatives attempted to reassure the public that seafood was indeed
safe. As a retort to the widely publicized anti-seafood statistics, Acting FDA
Commissioner James Benson told the New York Times, you have been severely
misled.233 Benson rejected the suggestion that NSSP needed more enforcement
teeth. He argued that the states had a strong commitment to the NSSP vol-
untary program, because states feared that failure to comply would make other
states reject their shellsh. Douglas Archer made similar arguments in his 1991
testimony before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives. Archer, Di-
rector of the Oce of Seafood, argued that even though 85% of all acute illness
from seafood derives from eating raw or partially cooked molluscan shellsh,
that is a very small fraction of all seafood consumed.34 Archer also denied that
the substantial number of shellsh illnesses proved the current program to be
inadequate. He maintained that the FDA system solved short term issues; the
long term goal of decreasing the risk of shellsh illness could only be attained
if society made a commitment to stop polluting its coastlines.
In 1991, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a report con-
cluding that most seafoods are wholesome and unlikely to cause illness7' Despite
its apparent endorsement, the NAS identied portions of the NSSP manual that
needed to be strengthened: unreliable shellsh tagging; ineective prosecution of
illegal shellsh harvesters; lack of uniform criteria for evaluating the patrolling
of growing areas; inconsistent product handling and maintenance of records;
and absence of specic temperatures for the holding and transporting of shell-
sh. :3 In response, the FDA made several changes to its safety programs It
increased its monitoring of
'' Miller, supra note 24, at 7.
Douglas L. Archer, supra note 98.
Ahmed, F.E ed, Committee on Evaluation of the Safety of Fishery Products,
Food &
Nutrition Board, Institute of Medicine, NAS, Seafood Safety, National Academy
Press, 1991.
:36 Id
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53shellsh waters, launching a special inspection program in 1991.237 It strength-
ened enforcement azai nst illegal harvesting. It emphasized public education
programs, disseminating information through the Oce of Consumer Aairs,
Oce of Public Aairs and its Seafood Hotline.38 The FDA was hasty to down-
play its new safety programs, however: These new programs do not mean that
sh are not safe food. What these new programs do mean is that FDA is enhanc-
ing its seafood inspection program to keep up with this increasingly important
part of the American diet
In February 1991, the Oce of Seafood was established within the Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) in order to strengthen and
provide greater focus on domestic and imported seafood safety programs. The
Oce has numerous responsibilities:
oversight of seafood inspection programs; research and testing of methods to
detect contaminants; creation of ways to prevent economic fraud; administration
of the NSSP, the NSSP Manual and the ICSSL; evaluation of seafood initiatives;
dissemination of information regarding regulation to the industry; creation of
training programs for inspectors; and surveillance of waters, processing plants
and seafood establishments.4' The FDA also reorganized CFSAN, allocating
functions which are primarily supportive in nature among four oces that all
operate under the Deputy Director for Systems and Support. One of these
four oces, the Oce of Field
:37 Miller, supra note 24, at 8.
:36 Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57. This hotline is operated by the FDA's
CFSAN. The
hotline has prerecorded messages available 24 hours a day, and public aairs
specialists to answer questions during limited hours. The prerecorded menu
includes topics such as women's health. product recall and seafood safety{ with
a special choice for raw oysters. The number is
I -800-FDA-40 10.
Miller, supra note 24 at 9.
24( Notice: Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Au-
thority;
Establishment of Seafood, 56 Fed. Reg. 7869 (1991).
:41 FDA, Sta Manual Guide FDA 1226.60, Organization and Delega-
tions Manual (1993).
available at http :// yin. cfsan. fda. gov/{lrd/sea-org. txt
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54Programs, contains a unit with expertise on the quality of shellsh growing wa-
ters and provides technical assistance for state shellsh sanitation programs.243
The Oce of Field Programs also allocates eld resources, tracks eld inspec-
tions, and evaluates sampling and analysis when performed.
The resources allocated to seafood increased. Food safety programs were
initially staed by 300 people, but 150 more positions were created in 1991 at
a cost of $9.5 million. In the 1992 scal year, another $15 million was spent
for 150 more positions>' The funding provided by Congress increased from $25
million in scal year 1990 to $40.5 million in 1993{ a 60% increase. :45 Trade
organizations adopted a more aggressive stance with regard to consumers. One
organization, the National Fisheries Institute (NFl) launched a campaign to
increase individual seafood consumption. In 1989 the NFl announced its goal
of increasing the per person seafood intake from 15.9 to 20 pounds by the year
2000)
The nineteen-nineties also contained a congressional battle over which agency
should have jurisdiction over shellsh. Rep. Pat Roberts, R-Kan. called this
melee the surf and turf ght.247 As of March 7, 1990, there were three bills
in the Senate and six bills in the House of Representatives that addressed the
increased regulation of sh.248 Bill 2228 was proposed to establish a mandatory
Federal Fish Inspection Program, based on the HACCP method The Congres-
sional record reects concern about selecting the appropriate agency to run this
24: Jerry A. Burke, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition's Oce of
S7tems and Support, 48 Food & Drug L.J. 495 (1991)
243 Id.
44 Miller, supra note 24, at 8.
:45 Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
2-l Miller, supra note 24 at 8.
:47 David S. Cloud, Food Safety: House 'Surf and Turf Fight Dooms Fish
Inspection, 48
Cong.Q. 43, 1990
:48 136 Cong. Rec. S2228-04 (daily ed Mar. 7, 1990).
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55mandatory program Candidates for the position included the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the NOAA., the NMFS and the FDA. The choice of
agency could not be resolved. A similar stalemate occurred in the Fish Safety
Act of 1990, 5 2924. Although the Senate and House agreed to establish a
comprehensive program that extended meat inspection to sh, they were divided
on which agency should run the program. The House passed a bill granting the
FDA and the NOAA the responsibility, but the Senate passed the bill with the
USDA in charge>' The bill died when the branches were unable to come to an
agreement.
During the furor in Congress, the FDA and the NMFS gave notice of pro-
posed rulemaking in which they would work together to establish a voluntary
fee-for-service inspection program run by both agencies>'5' In light of the surf
and turf' battle taking place in Congress, the proposed regulations seemed to
be an attempt to resolve the matter administratively. ,:s: The proposed rules
diered from the current NMFS program in that they intended to stimulate
the use of HACCP analysis and to regulate imports as well as domestic prod-
ucts. The notice also proposed to remove the existing regulations at 21 C.F.R.
x197 (which authorizes the inspection of canned oysters), suggesting that Sec-
tion 702A of the FD&C Act was no longer in use. Perhaps in retort, Congress
amended that section in 1992 and 1993. Congress redesignated Section 702A as
706, and deleted the word Agriculture from throughout the section in order to
refer only to the Secretary. 
:49 136 Cong. Rec. S12875-01 (daily ed. Sept 12, 1990).
David S. Cloud. Food Safety: House 'Surf and Turf Fight Dooms Fish In-
spection, 48
Cong.Q. 43, 1990.
55 Fed. Reg. 26334 (1990).
:s: Hutt, supra note 143, at 268.
' Pub. L. No.102-571, 106 Stat. 4498 (1992) and Pub. L. No. 103-80
x3(dd) (2), 107 Stat. 779 (1993).
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56The increased concern with shellsh gained momentum as illnesses continued
to occur. For example, during November 1993, seven outbreaks occurred that
were related to the consumption of oysters)54 Forty ve people suered gas-
troenteritis after eating oysters harvested from Apalachicola Bay in Florida;
and contaminated oysters were identied as the cause of at least 180 illnesses in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Maryland and North Carolina. These outbreaks diered
from previous illnesses, however, because some of the regulatory protections cur-
tailed the severity of the harm. For example, the state health departments of
Louisiana, Mississippi and Maryland notied the CDC that several outbreaks of
gastroenteritis had occurred the previous week. Because of the tagging require-
ments, Louisiana was able to identify the source of the contaminated oysters,
and illnesses in Maryland were traced to oysters harvested from the same loca-
tion. Since the contaminated oysters had been distributed to at least fourteen
states the CDC notied state epidemiologists of potential oyster-associated
illnesses. The FDA, CDC and state ocials then collaborated and discovered
that the oysters contained Norwalk virus. The agencies quickly pinpointed the
etiology of this outbreak because specimens were collected and handled appro-
priately and new PCR-based [polymerase chain reaction] assays were available.
:5 The states then employed NSSP procedures regarding harvest area clo-
sures and recall procedures. The FDA issued a statement warning consumers
about the contaminated oysters, and the CDC reinforced this warning with a
memorandum to state epidemiologists and public health laboratory directors.
:54 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep 49, supra note 41.
Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Vir-
ginia. Id.
Id.
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57In 1994 the FDA oered the Interstate Shellsh Sanitation Conference (ISSC)
the option of controlling Vibrio vulnicus bacterium in raw oysters by ban-
ning harvest intended for raw consumption from the Gulf of Mexico between
April and October. The Conference rejected this suggestion, but performed a
year-long study on time and temperature as related to the probability of Vib-
rio infection in at-risk populations)57 At the next annual ISSC conference, the
states proposed a requirement that oysters be refridgerated when water reaches
a particular temperature; specically, if waters attain a monthly maximum tem-
perature greater than 84 degrees fahrenheit, oysters must be chilled within six
hours of harvesting. This measure was approved :sS
Perhaps one can explain the conference's sudden willingness to adopt more
stringent measures by analyzing events intervening between the two ISSC meet-
ings. Between December 1994 and January 1995 a multistate outbreak of viral
gastroenteritis occurred that was associated with the consumption of steamed
or roasted oysters. The CDC reported thirty-four incidences of food poisoning
that resembled the u-like illness caused by Norwalk virus)59 The oysters were
harvested from Apalachicola Bay, Florida{ an area that is frequently closed be-
cause waste treatment failures discharge untreated sewage into the bay.& Just
recently, in 1984, authorities had closed Apalachicola Bay because 85 people
contracted gastroenteritis from eating the bay's oysters. :61 In the 1994-1995
incident, authorities closed the bay as soon as the outbreak was reported, but
were surprised to discover that the fecal coliform levels in both water and oyster
:57 John Henkel, FDA, States Collaborate For Safety's Sake, FDA Consumer,
Mar. 1996 at
27, 29-30.
:s Id.
:54 Kurtzweil, supra note 19. See also Centers for Disease Control, Multistate
Outbreak of
I 'it-al Gass'roenteritis Associated with Consumption of Oysters{ Apalachicola
Bay, Florida,
December 1994-January 1995, 44 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 2 (Jan.
20, 1995).
 Pollution Narrows, supra note 22, at 12. Id.
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58meat were within acceptable limits. Authorities hypothesize that increased
recreational and commercial boating over the holiday season introduced Nor-
walk virus into the bay, but since the water met microbiological standards, the
virus remained undetected. This inherent inaccuracy of microbiological testing{
the disparity between fecal coliform and actual contamination{ also made it im-
possible to determine when the bay was safe for reopening. Illnesses continued
to occur up to one week after authorities closed the bay and recalled the product.
The tagging, although it identied the general region of harvest, was inadequate
to recall oysters from a specic site. The continued foodborne illness proved that
the contaminated product had remained on the market and that cooking the
oysters did not protect consumers from illness.
In January 1997, President Clinton made a radio address announcing his
intentions to increase the safety of the food supply. The President broadcast
that he would request $43.2 million in his 1998 budget to fund a nationwide
early warning system for foodborne illness, increase seafood safety inspections
and expand food safety research, training and education. On May 12, 1997
Vice President Al Gore announced a ve-point Administration plan of how the
proposed budget would be used to increase food safety. The Administration
intended to allocate $8.5 million to hire additional FDA inspectors for seafood
plants, and to expand application of the seafood HACCP system to fruit and
vegetable juice industries. Other objectives included developing a method to
detect those pathogens now undetectable (such as hepatitis A) and creating
an early warning system that would respond to outbreaks and collect data for
future use
FDA, U.S Dept of Agriculture, U S. Environmental Protection Agency, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention, Report to the President, Food Safety
from Farm to Table: A National Food Safety Initiative (May, 1997) available at
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/foodsafe /report html.
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59The Vice President's plan also hoped to establish a new intergovernmental group
to improve coordination between federal, state and local responses to outbreaks.
In June of 1997 a federal register was published announcing that the ISSC
had decided to reconstitute the NSSP Manual of Operations in the form of a
Shellsh Sanitation Model Ordinance in order to facilitate uniform adoption
by the member States.)9263 The Model Ordinance is still a federal guideline,
and is still subject to FDA policies regarding public notice and opportunity to
comment, but the shift to a Model Ordinance makes the NSSP Manual more
resemble the recommendations of the 1997 Food Code, published at the same
time  The FDA plans to continue publishing revisions and interpretations of
the NSSP Model Ordinance much as it has with the Manual of Operations, and
it plans to use the annual meeting of the ISSC to provide a forum for public
discussion.'65 Thus, the FDA seemed to be sending the message that despite the
upheavals in the control of shellsh, despite the impending mandatory HACCP
regulations, the FDA's cooperative relationship with the states remains a vital
part of shellsh sanitation.
:63 62 Fed. Reg 34480(1997)
 U.S. Dep't HHS, Food Code: 1997 Recommendations qf the US. Public
Health Service,
1997.
:s Id at 34481.
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60Chapter Seven
The History of the HACCP Plan
From the beginning of the decade there was a urry of activity heralding the
arrival of the new HACCP regulations In 1991, Commissioner Kessler requested
that the Agency study the feasibility of requiring industry-operated HACCP
systems for seafood coupled with mandatory inspections by FDA that... would
review the adequacy of those HACCP systems.266 In March of 1993, the FDA
announced that it was developing mandatory HACCP requirements as part of
its inspection program.267 In 1994, the Secretary of HI-IS publicized its plan to
establish a food safety initiative that would require new controls in the seafood
industry>'68 The Clinton Administration supported the promulgation of regu-
lations requiring seafood processors{ particularly molluscan shellsh plants{ to
adopt HACCP controlsio9 In late 1995 the new rules to ensure seafood safety
were issued)7i
The development of the HACCP system had actually started long before the
stream of public announcements occurred. The principle of HACCP was born in
1959, during the development of food products for the NASA space program)7'
Pillsbury Company was charged with the task of manufacturing food products
that had an absolute assurance of safety. Several
' Thomas J. Billy supra note 57.
 Id
:66 DIOGENES, FDA No. P94-4, FOI Services (Jan. 21, 1994).
:69 DIOGENES, FDA No. P95-9, FOI Services (Dec. 5, 1995).
:7: 60 Fed Reg 65197 (Dec. 18, 1995) and 60 Fed. Reg. 65201 (Dec. 18,
1995). See also Food Safety Initiative Fact Sheet, May 12, 1997 http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/|
dms/fsfact.html
Merle Pierson, An Overview of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HA
CC?,' and Its
Application to Animal Production Food Safety, HACCP Symposium, De-
partment of Food
Science and Technology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg, VA
24061, available at: http //www cvm. uiuc. edu/haccp/symposiumipierson.
html
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61suggestions were considered and rejected. For example, sampling for pathogenic
microorganisms was inaccurate even if more than half of the food units were
tested. The Zero Defects Concept was rejected because science lacked a reli-
able, non-destructive, testing method for bacterial pathogens. Instead, Pillsbury
adopted the U.S. Army's Modes of Failure concept, which predicted places in
which safety risks were likely to occur and then monitored those risk areas The
army's notion of risk areas developed into the Critical Control Points used in
I-IACCP plans today.
The U.S. Conference on Food Protection that took place in 1971 further
publicized the principles of HACCP as a means of increasing food safety. After
canned potato soup caused an outbreak of botulism in 1972, the FDA used
HACCP concepts to develop regulations for low acid canned foods.272 The new
regulations moved HACCP principles from a mere scientic theory into a reality,
and the transition was a success. Botulism no longer posed a threat to canned
goods, and, according to the NAS, canned sh became one of the safest of
seafood items. In 1985 the NAS published a report suggesting that HACCP
be applied to food production beyond canned goods :73 The National Advisory
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods (NACMIF). which advises the
USDA. FDA and NMFS (among others), reinforced the NAS' conclusion. The
NACMIF recommended adoption of HACCP principles for the manufacturing
of food products in
1989. 274
Although many reputable agencies endorsed the HACCP program, the FDA
needed information regarding the application of HACCP principles to the seafood
industry in particular.
7 44Fed.Reg. 16215 (1979), codied in2l CF.Rx1]3.
:73 National Academy of Sciences, Microbiological Criteria for Foods and
Food Ingredients, 1985. See also Pierson, supra note 271.
274 Id.
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62In 1986, NOAA operated a Model Seafood Surveillance Project (MSSP) at the
request of Congress. The project conducted 49 workshops involving 1,200 indus-
try, state and university participants.75 The MSSP produced sixteen regulatory
models for specic seafood products'6 and manuals on how to apply HACCP to
most segments of the seafood industry.277 Seafood trade associations and Sea
Grant colleges also operated pilot programs and published information on the
application of HACCP to seafood)7 For example, the New England Fisheries
Development Association (NEFDA) ran a pilot program for fteen processing
rms. In 1991, the FDA and NOAA ran a joint pilot program for all types
of seafood.279 Seafood rms volunteered to adopt HACCP based controls and
the FDAINOAA then conducted inspections to determine how these rms were
operating under HACCP.80 Therefore, when the administration published its
regulations in 1995, a good part of the industry had either experienced or at
least heard of the HACCP system. Still, the seafood HACCP program has at-
tracted a lot of attention because it is the rst time the HACCP system will
be required for the processing and storage of a U.S. food commodity on an
industry-wide basis.
The FDA decided to adopt a HACCP based system for several reasons. Un-
der the program in place when the HACCP rules took eect, the FDA enforced
the FD&C Act through
59 Fed. Reg. 4142 at 4150 (1994).
 Id.
:7 Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11
:78 The New England Fisheries Development Association (NEFDA) received
federal grants
in order to help rms in the northeast implement their HACCP systems. 59
Fed. Reg. 4142 at 4151 (1994).
:7 Id.
Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57. In July 1992, NMIFS published a Federal
Register notice announcing the availability of a new seafood inspection program
based on Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles. NMIFS,
IVMFS HACCP Manual, available at http://www nmfs.gov/iss/manual html
The NMFS obtained its authority from 50 C.F.R x260. 103(c).
Kurtzweil, supra note 19.
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63periodic, unannounced, and mandatory inspections of seafood processors, pack-
ers, repackers and v. arehouses. With regard to imported seafood, the FDA
reviewed entry documents in order to decide whether to release, visually exam-
ine or sample each shipment; a tested shipment that failed v as reconditioned,
destroyed, or exported.2 These inspections provided the agency with a snap-
shot of food safety conditions. Snapshot regulation can be ineectual because
it captures only one moment in time; it does not reveal whether the processor
regularly uses safe handling practices. Furthermore, the agency must use its
single snapshot to prove that the processor has done something wrong) In its
proposed regulations, the FDA asserted that this periodic inspection had not
produced a minimum level of safety.2 The FDA hoped that the HACCP sys-
tem would remedy the weaknesses of the snapshot system by transferring to the
processor the burden of demonstrating that he utilizes safe handling practices.
The new HACCP regulations also had support from the industry, the states,
and academia. The industry declared that a new system was necessary in order
to maintain consumer condence in both the domestic and foreign markets. The
FDA, who agreed that the existing system was inadequate, rejected the option
of increasing the frequency of inspections. The NAS had recommended adoption
of HACCP principles, but a voluntary I-IACCP program would do little more
than the NOAA program already in place. :ss The FDA turned instead to the
proposed congressional bills regarding seafood inspection. Although the bills
had all failed, they shared one common element: a mandatory HACCP-based
inspection system) Since the congressional battle
The FDA has the power to detain all future shipments if an importer has a
history of
failure.
:33 6OFed.Reg 65096at65098(1995).
 The FDA also argued that the tort system could not protect consumers be-
cause it was
impossible to trace illness to a particular food or food processor. 59 Fed.Reg.4
142 at 4186 (1994).
 Id.
62
64had focused on which agency should enforce the program, the FDA reasoned that
HACCP principles were generally accepted. The largest seafood industry trade
association, the NFl, testied at congressional hearings in support of HACCP
legislation from 1989 through 1992, and in 1993 the NFl requested that the
Secretary of I-il-IS not wait for congressional legislation any longer.:57 Finally,
the U.S. was catapulted into action when the European Economic Community
(EEC) announced in 1993 that it intended to adopt a HACCP system. In order
to export to the EEC, other countries would need equivalent manufacturing
requirements. Since the U.S. is the world's largest exporter of shery products,
the EEC and other recipients of U.S-exported seafood exerted great pressure on
the U.S. to adopt a HACCP system of its own)
HACCP is often described as a program that is not run by the government.
Rather, the government uses inspections to ensure that industry systems are
adequate and working. It is the responsibility of the processor to identify haz-
ards that are reasonably likely to occur. If failure of a particular processing
step would create a health hazard, that step of the process is a Critical Control
Point. The processors must monitor these critical control points and record the
results
for inspection. The Director of the Oce of Seafood summarized the HACCP
system:
HACCP requires that processors have a written plan that (1) identies the
likely hazards that could aect their products (2) identies critical control points
where a failure is likely to cause or permit the hazard to occur (3) establishes
critical limits or measureable operating parameters at each critical control point
such as cooking and refridgerating temperatures and (4) establishes both mon-
itoring procedures and recordkeeping procedures to systematically record the
results of the
:s Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11.
:57  FedReg. 4142, at 4151 (1994).
:s Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57. For example, Canada, Iceland, Australia
and the EEC adopted HACCP principles. See 59 Fed.Reg. 4142, at 4152 (1994).
:s' Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57.
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65Although the FDA still uses periodic inspection to enforce regulation, its in-
spections test whether the processor has been complying over time, because the
processor must have a written plan and records proving how well critical limits
have been met.
The FDA has declared that the HACCP system is authorized under both the
FD&C Act (21 U S.C.x342) and the PHS Act (42 U.S.C.x264). Recall that the
FD&C Act prohibits all adulterated and misbranded food in interstate com-
merce. :90 Section 701(a) authorizes the agency to adopt regulations for the
ecient enforcement of the act. The FDA claims that the HACCP controls are
ecient, as the minimum necessary to ensure that... the processing and impor-
tation of sh and shery products will not result in a product that is injurious
to health. p' If a processor fails to comply with HACCP, the food is adulterated
within the meaning of x402(a)(4) and subject to regulatory action by the FDA.
Note that the FDA has shifted the burden of proof to the processor, who must
demonstrate that the product is not unsafe. This shift is permissible because
x402(a)(4) does not require that the food actually be hazardous or contami-
nated in order for the FDA to exclude it from commerce. The FDA also cites
the PHS Act, which prevents the spread of disease, as authority for the HACCP
program. Section 361 empowers the Surgeon General (and, by delegation, the
FDA) to make and enforce such regulations as the FDA determines necessary to
prevent the introduction, transmission or spread of communicable disease. The
tagging requirement particularly falls within the PHS Act: since shellsh har-
vested from non-classied waters are possible vectors of illness, identifying their
source will halt interstate transport and prevent the spread of communicable
disease. :s:
 21 U.S.C x342, x402(a)(l). Adulterated is dened as containing any
substance that may make the food injurious to health or if quality defects aect
its tness as food.
59 FedReg. 4142, at 4150 (1994).
:9: Id at 4169.
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66Chapter Eight
The Regulations Themselves
The HACCP regulations are codied in 21 C.F.R. x 123. The nal regulations
were published on December 18, 1995, and became eective on December 18,
1997 293 Subpart A contains the general provisions, including denitions. Mol-
luscan shellsh are dened as any edible species of fresh or frozen oysters, clams,
mussels or scallops, or edible portions of such species, except when the product
consists entirely of the shucked adductor muscle.  This language is important
because it extends shellsh regulation to include scallops; however, the adduc-
tor exception demonstrates the same underlying rationale that shellsh require
special precautions because they are eaten whole. The expansion of jurisdiction
for HACCP purposes required similar amendments to other shellsh provisions.
On the same day, December 18, 1995, regulations amended 21 C.F.R. x 1240
prohibiting the interstate shipment of shellsh likely to cause communicable
disease. First, the amendment dened shellsh using the exact same language
as x 123.3(h).295 Second, the amendment to x 1240.60 added the word mol-
luscanin order to distinguish bivalve shellsh from other crustaceans, such as
crabs and lobsters. Finally, the amendment set forth several new requirements:
shellsh must be tagged with the date, place of harvest, type and quantity of
shellsh, and the identity of the harvester. Noncompliance subjects the shellsh
to seizure and destruction>'06
:9; 60 FedReg. 65197 (Dec. 18, 1995)(eective Dec. 18, 1997).
294 21 C.F.R. x 123.3(h) (1997).
295 60 Fed. Reg. 65201 (Dec. 18, 1995), codied at 21 C.F.R. x1240.3(r)
(eective Dec. 18.
1997).
26 21 C.F.R. x 1240.60 (b).(c) &(d) (1997).
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67The HACCP controls apply to all commercial seafood in interstate commerce,
including both domestically produced and imported products. Seafood im-
porters must verify that seafood is processed under HACCP standards{ quite
an important feature of the regulation, since more than half of this country's
seafood is imported from almost 135 countries>'97 Seafood processors, repackers
and warehouses must follow HACCP.9 Processing is dened as handling, stor-
ing, preparing, heading, eviscerating, shucking, freezing, changing into dierent
market forms, manufacturing, preserving, packing, labeling, dockside unloading
or holding.2 This broad denition includes those who handle low acid canned
foods, even though particular safety hazards in their processing will also be
subject to 21 C.F.R. x1  The regulations do not apply to those who harvest
or transport shery products without otherwise engaging in processing{ such
as shing vessels. The regulations also exclude the operation of retail establish-
ments.
The HACCP regulations require a processor to establish a HACCP plan only
if the processor determines that one or more food safety hazards are reasonably
likely to occur.30 Food safety hazards may take place before, during and after
harvest and they may be caused by events
97 Kurtzweil, supra note 19. In 1991, 3,014,819,000 pounds were imported,
worth
$5,617,887,000, making the United States the world's second largest seafood
importing nation.
59 FedReg. 4142, at 4151 (1994).
Kurtzweil, supra note 19. The FDA has declared that only processors in-
volved in interstate commerce are covered by the regulation. FDA/CFSAN:
HACCP Regulation for Fish and Fishery Products{ Questions and Answers,
http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/|-dms/qa2haccp.html#xii
21 CFR. x123.3(k)(1).
3CX' 21 C F R. x 123(e): Products subject to other regulations. For sh and
shery products
that are subject to the requirements of part 113 or 114... the HACCP plan
need not list the food safety hazard associated with the formation of Clostrid-
ium botulinum toxin in the nished, hermetically sealed container, nor list the
controls to prevent that food safety hazard
21 C.F.R. x123.3(k)(2).
 See x 123.6(b): every processor shall have a HACCP plan whenever
a hazard analysis reveals one or more food safety hazards that are reasonably
likely to occur. Under x 123 6(f) sanitation controls may be included in the
HACCP plan, but need not be included if they are monitored in accordance
with x 123. 11(b).
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68outside the processor's or importer's direct control.33 Generally, the processor
must have a HACCP plan specic to each location and each kind of sh or shery
product; however, if a few products share the same hazards, points limits, and
procedures, those products may be grouped together under one plan.3 The
FDA prefers separate plans because hazards can vary according to location, type
of equipment, quality of the facility, and procedures. The proposed regulations
predicted that the number of critical control points would range between two
and twelve per product:
Maintenance of a HACCP plan is an ongoing process. Each processor must
reassess the adequacy of its plan on an annual basis and, additionally, any
time an event occurs that may aect the quality of the plan.306 The processor
must also: monitor consumer complaints; calibrate instruments; perform end-
product testing, records review and documentation; and take corrective actions.
Because scientic knowledge on shellsh safety is incomplete, the government
cannot expect a processor to produce an entirely safe product. For example,
there is no known method to prevent the presence of Vibrio vulnicus bacteria
in shellsh. Therefore, the standard used is whether processors have taken
precautions that are reasonable in light of available information In the case of
Vibrio vulnicus, since we do have information that temperature may limit the
post-harvest growth of bacteria, processors ought to adopt temperature controls.
The requirement of continuous review reassures the FDA that the processor will
incorporate new controls as they are discovered.
 21 C FR. x 123.6(a) and x 123.6 (c)(2)(ii).
' Id
59 Fed Reg. 4142, at 4156(1994).
" 21 CFR. x123.8(a).
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69The requirements for corrective actions appear in 21 C F R x 123 7 If mon-
itoring reveals that a critical control point is exceeding its critical limits, the
processor must follow either a corrective action plan he has already developed
under x 123.7(b), or he must follow the procedures set forth in x 123.7(c). The
procedures include segregating the aected product and reviewing the product
to determine its safety for distribution. If the product is unsafe for distribution,
the processor must prevent its shipment and probably must change his current
HACCP plan to prevent recurrance of the deviation. All corrective actions must
be documented.
Subpart C sets forth two additional requirements for raw molluscan shellsh307:
shellsh handlers may only obtain shellsh from approved waters, and such shell-
sh must be properly tagged to identify their source.308 The subpart entitled
source controls requires a processor to describe in his HACCP plan how he con-
trols the origin of his molluscan shellsh so that he accepts only those shellsh
that are harvested from approved waters and tagged with information in confor-
mity with 21 C.F.R. x1240.60(b).306 Section F240.60 requires date of harvest,
location of harvest by state and site, quantity and type of shellsh and name of
harvester or registration number of harvester's vessel. The date of harvest must
be accurate to the day because the safety of a harvesting area may vary within
24 hours due to tides, rainfall, winds or other events. Appropriate state control
will close harvesting areas within 24 hours of discovering adverse conditions;
therefore, tagging shellsh with the exact date and location ensures safe har-
vesting waters. Tags must identify the harvester so that he can be contacted for
direct information regarding the site of harvest or for an investigation regarding
tagging discrepancies. The processor's own records must indicate the date of
receipt and all of the mandatory tagging
 21 CF R.x123.20
'' Kurtzweil, siipra note 19.
21 CFR. x123.28
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70information.3'0 As an enforcement measure, the FDA will seize and destroy
shellsh that are not properly tagged.3
Just two months after publication of the proposed HACCP regulations, the
FDA announced that it was developing a Fish and Fishery Products Hazards
and Controls Guide.31 The Guide is intended to help the industry in identifying
potential hazards and developing HACCP plans. For example, the Guide lists
the hazards that can aect seafood, and the control measures that will either
prevent or minimize those hazards. The FDA planned for the Guide to include
model plans which, if emulated, would probably be adequate to meet HACCP
requirements.313 The FDA noted that in addition to human food safety hazards,
the Guide would address controls associated with quality marketability and eco-
nomic fraud. The presence of these additional hazards is probably a remnant of
a one-time proposal that would have required HACCP controls for risks other
than human safety.3'4 The FDA hypothesizes that in addition to helping imple-
ment HACCP plans, the Guide will help state and federal regulatory ocials
to evaluate HACCP plans. On April 7, 1994 the FDA published a notice of the
availability of the Fish and Fishery Product Hazards and Controls Guide draft
guidelines.3'5
21 C F.R. x123.28(c)
21 C FR. x 1240.60. The FDA also expressed the hope that x 1240.60 would
support state tagging requirements by providing a uniform system with stringent
punishment.
v:  FedReg. 12949; Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11. 59 FedReg.
4142, at 4156 (1994).
34 The proposed regulations considered including additional hazards{ such as
decomposition not normally associated with illness in humans{ in the HACCP
controls. The Codex Committee on Food Hygeine and the NOAA believed that
HACCP controls could be applied to other consumer risks without generating
too many critical control points. The FDA/NOAA pilot programs also included
HACCP controls beyond human food safety hazards. Nevertheless, the FDA
decided not to include these additional risks, because it had created HACCP
under section x402(a)(4), which applies only to substances that would render a
product injurious to health.
59Fed.Reg. 16655 (1994).
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71The creation of the HACCP regulations has required related programs to ed-
ucate the industry regarding HACCP. The need for education is actually en-
forced through 21 C.F.R. x 123.10, which requires training in the application of
HACCP principles to sh and shery
product processing that is at least equivalent to that received under stan-
dardized curriculum recognized as adequate by the U S. Food and Drug Administration.3'6
To help in training, the FDA created the Seafood HACCP Alliance, which in-
cludes federal agencies, state regulatory ocials, academia and industry trade
associations. The Alliance develops a HACCP training curriculum for both in-
dustry and regulators; the current program entails a three day course that relies
on the Hazards and Control Guide.3'7 The USDA joined the FDA to create the
HACCP Training Programs and Resources Database on the World Wide Web, in
order to support the increasing educational information needs of industry and
foodservice professionals in implementing HACCP programs.' The database
provides listings of training programs, resource materials and consultants. Ad-
ditional websites oer training progams that fulll the training requirement of
the nal regulations; for example, the U.S. Department of Commerce/NOAA
National Training Branch oers three day courses called HACCP Workshops
for Industry.3'9 The web also provides samples of generic HACCP plans as a
starting point for processors to develop their own plans.
316 21 C.F.R.x 123.10. For participants in the NJVWS HACCP based Pro-
gram, this training requirement falls under NMFS part 1 chapter 9 section 2.
'' Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11.
USDA/FDA, HACCP Training Programs and Resources Database, available
at http //www nal . usda. gov/fnic/foodborne/haccp/haccpy. html.
U.S Department of Commerce, National Training Branch, HACCP Work-
shops for Industry, available at: http://seafood.ssp.nmfs.gov/iss/training.html
 See, e.g. http //www-seafood. ucdavis. edu/haccp/plans/oysters.
htm#C2
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72Chapter Nine
Issues. Costs and Benets of the HACCP Program
Right from the beginning, the industry expressed concern about how to create
the newly-required HACCP plans. The FDA refused the industry's request for
pre-approval of plans, arguing that suciency of a particular plan can only be
determined under actual conditions. The FDA also contended that the combi-
nation of the Hazards and Controls Guide and the training course provided by
the Seafood Alliance would provide adequate information for the industry. Still,
the FDA admits that the HACCP programs will require extensive interaction
between the agency and the industry. The pilot programs run by NOAA in
1991 demonstrated that the FDA must provide technical support{ including a
considerable amount of consultation and
,3'1
assistance. - Even the pilot program rms, who had volunteered and who
were anxious to implement HACCP programs, discovered that identifying the
hazards and critical control points
associated with their products was a dicult taski
Another issue worrying the industry is the cost involved with implementing
a HACCP plan The FDA has diculty quantifying the feedback it receives from
pilot programs; however. some reactions seem fairly consistent. Costs were often
greater than expected33 and the FDA had underestimated the amount of time
needed to prepare a HACCP plan.4 The FDA calculated that there are 4,846
domestic seafood manufacturing plants that will be aected by the proposed
59 FedReg 4142 at 415 1( 1994)
3:: Id
3:3 Second Interim Report of Observations & Comments (October 31,
1997) available at
http://vm.cfsan.fda. gov/{dms/haccp-3 . html
3:4 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary
Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 60 Fed.Reg. 65096-01
(1995). FDA revised estimates to allocate 24 person hours to preparing a simple
plan and 144 hours for a complex plan.
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73rule< and that average plant costs will range from $6,400 to $23,000 for the rst
year, and from $4800 to $13,000 for subsequent years.32 Costs for the rst year
were divided as follows: 33% for compliance with sanitary provisions; 36% for
monitoring and recordkeeping; and 31% for equipment, temperature indicators
and temperature recorders. Additional costs included training the HACCP team
and employees, time and personnel needed to monitor, create and keep records,
consulting costs and equipment installation.
Nevertheless, when the FDA performed a regulatory impact analysis as re-
quired by Executive Order 12866,327 the agency concluded that the regulatory
option selected was the least burdensome option to accomplish the goal of con-
trolling all physical, chemical and microbiological hazards reasonably likely to be
present in seafood.32 In the pilot programs, rms noted that they experienced
more eective and ecient operations, higher level of condence in product
safety, and greater involvement and safety awareness by employees. The FDA
catalogued further benets of HACCP: decreased illness and death, reduced
enforcement costs, increased consumer condence, better process control, im-
proved employee morale, and continued exports. Unfortunately, even after the
regulations are implemented it will be dicult to evaluate the success of the
HACCP program. Although a decrease in seafood-borne illness would be cer-
tain success{ and the FDA predicts a decrease of 5,000-19,000 cases of seafood
illness and deaths per year329{ the inaccuracies of illness reporting are making
the FDA look for surrogate ways in which to evaluate its program.33
3:5  FedReg. 4142, at 4187 (1994).
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis.
Executive Order 12866 directs agencies to assess all costs and benets of
available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select reg-
ulatory approaches that maximize net benets (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety eects; distributive impacts; and eq-
uity). Final Regulatory Impact Analysis.
 Id
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74The FDA also performed a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis regarding the eect
of the regulation on small businesses.33' In the context of shellsh regulation,
attention to small seafood processors is critical because such small businesses
produce the vast majority of seafood types that account for most of the food-
associated reported illnesses332{ i.e., molluscan shellsh. The cost of imple-
menting a HACCP program is determined by the complexity of processing and
hazards, not by the size of the business or its output.333 Therefore, any xed
costs will aect small businesses disproportionately. The FDA estimated that
for each 1% increase in the price of seafood, 140 small processors will go out of
business; nevertheless, the agency concluded that the eect on small businesses
was acceptable.3 The FDA argued that increased consumer condence could
increase the demand for seafood, which in turn would counter any price increase.
The FDA also hypothesized that current proposals to apply HACCP regulations
to meat and poultry would similarly raise meat and poultry prices; therefore,
consumers will not substitute other foods for shellsh. Finally, the FDA be-
lieved that the Hazards and Controls Guide, the two year window in which to
comply, and the aid of the Seafood Alliance meant that small businesses could
meet HACCP requirements without undue hardship. 
39 59 FedReg. 4142, at 4188 (1994). By attributing dierent costs according
to the severity of the illness, the FDA values the safety benets of I-IACCP at
$1 5-17 million per year. Id.
 Dr. Michael Friedman, supra note 11. The diculty of judging program
success by illnesses is illustrated by the case of neurotoxic shellsh poisoning
(NSP). NSP is primarily associated with recreational shing; therefore, these
illnesses are not likely to decrease. 59 Fed Reg. 4142, at 4188 (1994).
Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96-3 54).
33: Final Regulatory Impact Analysis. The FDA estimates that 80% of the
seafood processors covered by HACCP regulations are small, which is dened
as less than $1 million annual gross revenue for nonshrimp rms. 59 Fed.Reg.
4142 at 4189 (1994).
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis.
 Id.
 Id
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75One can imagine that in the FDA's cost-benet analysis of the HACCP system,
the agency placed high value on ending the accusation that inspections are not
performed with enough frequency. Historically, the perceived inadequacy of the
snapshot inspections subjected the FDA to much criticism. For example, many
would cite the statistic that although 60% of seafood consumed in the U.S.
is imported, the FDA physically examines less than 5% of all lots of seafood.
The FDA has defended the small number of inspections, asserting that lots
vary in size, the FDA targets by experience, and domestic laws will subject
the food to further processing within the U.S. The FDA claims that tabulation
of the actual number of inspections is impossible because the number of state
inspections is unknown and incompatibility between federal and state programs
prevents the integration of federal and state data. Finally, the FDA cites the
NAS for the principle that increased frequency of inspections would have no
bearing on safety. Thus, the FDA's cost-benet analysis would never advocate
simply increasing inspections.
With the HACCP program, however, the FDA may resolve the frequency-
of-inspection debate. While inspection of HACCP plans will continue as part of
routine, mandatory plant examinations,336 the HACCP requirements will make
these inspections more meaningful. One snapshot will reveal whether a pro-
cessor has maintained adequate sanitary precautions, and it will predict with
some accuracy whether contamination will occur in future. Thus, it is the pro-
cessors HACCP plan that will prevent adulterated products from reaching the
consumer{ not an FDA agent inspecting each product. Additionally, HACCP
inspections are more easily coordinated with the states so that enforcement re-
sources and subsequent data can be shared. The FDA calls the HACCP system
leveraging its resources: while the number of inspections themselves will not
increase, they will make a bigger dierence in the safety of seafood.
3k  FedReg. 4142, at 4156 (1994).
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76Despite the FDA's faith in the benets of I-IACCP-based safety measures, one
must not overlook the program's limitations. The nal regulations apply only
to processors; thus, they exclude shing vessels, common carriers and retail
establishments.337 Poor handling during transport or retail can certainly create
health hazards; for example, time and temperature during transport and sani-
tary practices at the retail level fundamentally aect seafood safety. The FDA
admits that seafood products have a relatively short shelf-life once they reach
restaurants, that they are subject to cross-contamination, and that a signicant
number of reported acute health problems were likely linked to handling and
preparation practices in food service establishments. n Nevertheless, because
the FDA has never directly regulated shing vessels, common carriers or retail
establishments, the agency doubted whether a HACCP system would be appro-
priate in those venues. The agency argued that the sheer number of vessels,
carriers and retail establishments would overwhelm any existing or foreseeable
Federal regulatory structure. 'p Instead, the FDA hoped that processors them-
selves would enforce a HACCP program for transportation and retail. Since
HACCP requires that processors monitor the quality of the raw materials they
receive, processors could potentially demand that their suppliers use safe han-
dling practices. Retailers are also urged to adopt HACCP principles in the
FDA's 1997 edition of the Food Code, which is not binding but serves as model
legislation for state and territorial agencies that license and inspect food service
establishments, food vending operations and food
 Dr Michael Friedman, supra note 11. 59 Fed Reg. 4142. at 4154 (1994).
Dr Michael Friedman, supra note 11.
' Kurtzweil, supra note 19.
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77Ironically, it is the FDA itself who cast doubt upon the wisdom of exempting
vessels and retail establishments from HACCP requirements. Despite the FDA's
now- vigorous defense of its decision, the agency was not always so certain
of how to approach the vessel/retail issue. In fact, in the original proposed
regulations the FDA asked for public discussion on whether the agency were
right to rely on processors for the enforcement of safe handling practices>'4'
The FDA welcomed input on whether HACCP would be eective as applied
to transportation companies. The agency also called the model food codes a
tentative approach and requested comments on how to regulate the retail sector.
The FDA declares that the HACCP program will make great changes, that it
will signicantly reduce illness{ but vessels, carriers and retail establishments
may very well continue to operate as if HACCP were never enacted.
Another uncertainty of the HACCP system is how state and federal regu-
lation will actually overlap. For example, when asked whether HACCP super-
sedes NSSP, the FDA's answer was that states enforce NSSP by establishing
regulations, and processors of raw molluscan shellsh must still comply with
state lawY The NSSP has been revised to incorporate HACCP requirements,
and changes in state regulations should soon follow, but it seems questionable
whether the language of HACCP, NSSP and state regulations will always be a
perfect match. Take, for example, the receipt of raw molluscan shellsh from
unapproved growing waters:
x 123.20 of the HACCP regulations sets forth requirements regarding re-
ceipt of shellsh. Section 123's requirements are mandatory if processing does
not include a treatment that ensures the destruction of vegetative cells of mi-
croorganisms of public health concern.343 Thus, if a
59 Fed.Reg. 4142, at 4154 (1994).
;4: FDA/CFSAN: HACC'P Regulation for Fish and Fishery Products{ Ques-
tions and Answers, available at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/.|dms/qa2haccp html#xii
 21 C.FR. x123.20
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78processor will be heat-treating the shellsh suciently to destroy pathogens,
for HACCP
purposes he need not comply with x 123.28 regarding approved sources.
However, State statutes do not at present allow harvesting from unapproved
waters unless molluscan shellsh will be
relayed or depurated. Therefore, despite the HACCP exception, it seems
unlikely that processors could receive shellsh from unapproved waters without
violating the state regulations. This
creates a dual regulatory system whenever HACCP and state requirements
do not match perfectly.
The HACCP program will not eclipse all past regulations. It is undisputed
that the new
requirements do not aect every participant in the shellsh industry, and
the FDA has insisted that HACCP will not replace the function of the states)
Indeed, HACCP requires a shellsh control authority{ either federal or state{
to classify harvesting areas, enforce harvesting controls and
certify shellsh processors.345 After HACCP, the FDA will continue to per-
form many of its past functions: it will set standards for seafood contaminants;
it will promulgate Good Manufacturing Practices and Model Food Codes;3 and
it will provide nancial support to the states.347 Despite the many benets of
the new regulations, HACCP remains an imperfect solution. The shellsh
industry contains small, seasonal businesses that are dominated by manual
labor; they may nd it dicult to adopt the highly technical HACCP require-
ments And, even a heavy burden on
processors to demonstrate the safety of their incoming materials may not be
adequate to deter them from cheaper{ and riskier{ seafood.
CF SAN handout, 1995, available at: http://vm.cfsan.fda. gov/|lrd/sea-
ovr. txt ' 21 CFR. x123.3(o)
 CFSAN handout, 1995
Thomas J. Billy, supra note 57. The total expenditure by state, federal and
local regulator bodies for regulation of seafood is estimated to exceed $100
million per year.
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79Hopefully, the HACCP system will succeed in preventing the outbreaks de-
scribed in previous chapters. The tagging requirements should write a new
ending to the stories about auents who could not nd the source of contami-
nated shellsh. The documentation requirements should repair the inadequacies
of snapshot inspections. The shift in burden of proof and increased enforcement
power may persuade processors to comply with sanitation precautions. Thus,
even if the HACCP program is not the nal word on shellsh regulation, it
promises to be a high point in the history of seafood safety.
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80Chapter Ten
Postscript
An historical survey is an odd creature. The peaks and valleys that scar each
decade suddenly become a gentle slope when one steps back to survey the land-
scape. Events such as the enactment of HACCP regulations become not a
phenomenon, but a logical step in the evolution of shellsh safety. Since 1906
the federal government has been involved in protecting the public from con-
taminated shellsh. Perhaps the mandatory inspection program that appeared
ninety-one years later took too long to evolve; perhaps it was only after the
natural resources were irretrieveably polluted that the program became indis-
pensable. Regardless, the HACCP program is not the single, dening, moment
in a century of shellsh regulation.
In 1910, at the very beginning of shellsh regulation, one author had formed
a connection between shellsh and disease. He already knew that shellsh were
aected by the cleanliness of surrounding water. He knew that bivalves sifted
out bacterium in lter feeding, that eating raw shellsh was particularly risky,
and that pollution from cities posed a great danger. However, he
found little sympathy for his concerns:
It is a curious fact that many persons who may be willing to accept the truth
of statements on the nature of infectious diseases and their transmission, yet
regard the dissemination of such knowledge almost with resentment, apparently
because it is disturbing to peace of mind, and may have a tendency to interfere
with careless habits. Who has not heard remarks of this nature: { Our fathers
lived in comparative safety, but science has surrounded us with deadly germs...
The church, the theater, the cars are germ-laden, and we are not able to draw
a comfortable breath. Away with such nonsense! We must live, and the germ
theorists are trying to make existence impossible.348
 James Lawrence Kellogg, Shell-sh Industries (1910)
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81There has been no single, dening moment in this century of regulation; but if a
moment had to be chosen, it would be the instant that society placed importance
on shellsh safety. Far more momentous than any regulation was the day that
the public did not regard dissemination of information with resentment. The day
that science turned its attention to the etiology of outbreaks and the ability of
shellsh to carry pathogens, the day that shellsh sanitation became a pressing
issue, and the states, industry and federal government formed a cooperative
program to combat shellsh-related illness{ those are the events that shape the
history of shellsh regulation.
Each new regulation is enacted with high hopes and great expectations. Per-
haps the HACCP program will indeed prevent the illnesses and outbreaks that
dominate this historical survey{ but no inspection regulation can be expected to
resolve one fundamental problem of shellsh safety: until society agrees to halt
pollution, shellsh will never be safe. It is conceded that the new regulations are
necessary to monitor the post-harvest handling of shellsh. It is admitted that
naturally-occurring pathogens contaminate even those shellsh harvested from
pristine waters. But if society continues to pollute, the acres of water closed to
harvesting will continue to increase. Re-laying is useless if there are no clean
waters. A regulation may prevent every single polluted clam from reaching
the consumer, but if no unpolluted clams exist, how hollow the triumph. The
shellsh industry shares a community resource, and unless society ensures the
quality of that resource, regulations can only temporarily solve health issues.
Perhaps the single, dening moment of shellsh regulation lies in the future: on
the day we can nally promise that the pollution of shellsh waters has ended.
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